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ARTICLES
NATURAL TRANSPLANTS
VANESSA CASADO PÉREZ† & YAEL R. LIFSHITZ‡
Policymakers are constantly faced with the complex task of managing novel challenges. At times, these challenges result from new technologies: Consider fights over
allocating air rights for drones or decisions about how to share scarce vaccines in a
pandemic. Other times the resources are old, but the challenges are new, such as
how to fairly allocate water in times of unprecedented drought or previously undesirable rare earth minerals that are in demand for modern manufacturing and
energy production. Often, instead of carefully tailoring a regime to the new
resource, decisionmakers simply rely on mechanisms they are familiar with. When
jurisdictions borrow from each other, scholars call this a “legal transplant”—as
when one state copies another state’s innovations or when the federal government
learns from the “laboratories of democracy.” This Article unveils a new dimension
of legal transplants: transplants across subject areas. By transplants across subject
areas, this article refers to instances when a jurisdiction looks for doctrines in other
legal areas, often within its own legal system, when regulating a new resource or
addressing a new challenge.
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This Article makes three key contributions. First, it identifies a new type of transplant—between subject matters within a jurisdiction. Second, it analyzes the reasons for internal, cross-subject legal transplants and the criteria for selecting which
subject areas to copy from. Third, the Article brings the legal transplants literature
to bear, specifically, on natural resource law. It explores two cases, groundwater
and wind energy, where policymakers and courts have borrowed from other
resource schemes, often ignoring the scientific and social differences between these
natural resources. Other areas of law, such as the incorporation of contract doctrines in landlord-tenant relations, are also described to show the explanatory
power of the natural transplant framework. This conceptual framework is then
applied to new mineral developments in space and the deep sea. Cross-subject
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transplants may be more prevalent than previously appreciated, and understanding
them will pave the way to analyze the regulation of new developments in natural
resources, infrastructure, and beyond.
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INTRODUCTION
Monumental infrastructure and energy shifts are currently
underway. In March 2021, for instance, President Biden announced
the start of a new era with regards to offshore wind energy,1 which is
unprecedented in the United States. As a result, decisionmakers at the
federal level will now need to decide how to divide and govern the
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1 Press Release, The White House, FACT SHEET: Biden Administration Jumpstarts
Offshore Wind Energy Projects to Create Jobs (Mar. 29, 2021), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/29/fact-sheet-bidenadministration-jumpstarts-offshore-wind-energy-projects-to-create-jobs [https://perma.cc/
WY33-R69G].
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winds blowing over U.S. waters.2 Other large-scale plans include overhauling the electric grid, investing in electric vehicles, expanding
hydropower, and much more.3 All these grand new infrastructure and
energy projects will require policymakers to reassess the use of our
resources in light of modern challenges.
How will decisionmakers tackle the challenge of governing or
reassessing the use of resources? To answer, we look at current and
historical examples of resource governance. We use two novel case
studies that offer in-depth analysis of two key resources: groundwater
and wind energy. As we will see, an interesting pattern emerges:
Often, rather than carefully tailoring regimes to fit the resource at
hand or crafting rules from scratch, decisionmakers simply copy an
existing regime.
The key question, then, is why? Why is it that copying exists, and
moreover persists, even when the imported regime is sometimes illsuited for the task at hand? This Article offers a new conceptual
framework for answering this question by bringing together currently
separate strands of literature: the scholarship on resource economics
and the scholarship on “legal transplants.”
Legal transplants, in brief, are usually understood as a transfer of
a legal regime or rule from one jurisdiction to another.4 The literature
generally recognizes two types of transplants. The first is between similarly situated jurisdictions. This is known as “horizontal” transplanting.5 An illustrative example is borrowing between states within
the United States. For instance, several states are considering copying
44277-nyu_97-3 Sheet No. 34 Side A
06/13/2022 09:04:56

2 Wind energy was part of the Build Back Better Act. The bill did not pass the Senate,
but the Biden-Harris Administration is seeking to push forward offshore wind. Press
Release, The White House, FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Races to Deploy
Clean Energy that Creates Jobs and Lowers Costs (Jan. 12, 2022), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/01/12/fact-sheet-biden-harrisadministration-races-to-deploy-clean-energy-that-creates-jobs-and-lowers-costs [https://
perma.cc/74EU-7KR4] (detailing, among other things, the Department of the Interior’s
record-breaking offshore wind lease sale).
3 See generally Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 117-58, 135 Stat.
429 (2021).
4 Jonathan B. Wiener, Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants
and the Evolution of Global Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1295, 1298 (2001)
(defining legal transplants).
5 See id. at 1303 (describing customary international law as horizontal borrowing
across states). Note the use of the term “horizontal” here is different from the way it is
used in Yael R. Lifshitz, The Geometry of Property, 71 U. TORONTO L.J. 480 (2021)
(employing the term to refer to the spatial domain over which a property regime exerts
control) [hereinafter Lifshitz, The Geometry of Property].
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6 Greta Anderson, The Push for Player Pay Goes National, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Oct.
4, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/10/04/us-congressman-proposecollege-athlete-payment-bill [https://perma.cc/9GJ8-YDCP].
7 Wiener, supra note 4, at 1297, 1303–04.
8 See id. at 1303–04 (offering the United States and European Union as examples of
vertical legal borrowing from their own member states); see also Toby S. Goldbach, Legal
Norms’ Distinctiveness in Legal Transplants and Global Legal Pluralism 15–18 (Allard
Sch. of L. at Univ. of B.C., Working Paper, 2013), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2306782
[https://perma.cc/3VJT-7N5N] (discussing the United States-style litigation approach as the
standard for international commercial arbitration).
9 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, WIND VISION: A NEW ERA FOR WIND POWER IN THE
UNITED STATES 3–5 (2015) (“[F]rom 2000 to 2013, installed capacity increased at a rate of
nearly 30% per year.”) [hereinafter DOE, WIND VISION]. The current cumulative total
installed wind capacity in the United States is 121,955 megawatts. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
LAND-BASED WIND MARKET REPORT 3 (2021), https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/
2021-08/Land-Based%20Wind%20Market%20Report%202021%20Edition_Full%
20Report_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4T82-94H4].
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California’s legislation on salaries for college athletes.6 The second
dimension along which transplanting occurs is between jurisdictions
that are either “above” or “below” each other. This is known as a
“vertical” transplant.7 For example, a vertical transplant occurs when
states borrow from federal law or when international law borrows
from domestic law.8
This Article underscores another type of transplant: transplants
within the same jurisdiction but across subject matters. This third
option, the “cross-subject transplant,” has thus far been understudied
and is the primary focus of this Article. Cross-subject transplants may
be both more prevalent—and more problematic—than the types of
transplants scholars usually explore. Using examples from natural
resource law, this Article highlights the transfers of legal rules and
doctrines that occur within a jurisdiction, while also offering a conceptual framework to understand why these transfers occur and why a
particular subject matter is copied.
To illustrate how the three transplant dimensions might operate,
consider the following example. Imagine a new resource is discovered
or becomes newly valuable in light of big infrastructure projects or
shifts in energy policy. Decisionmakers now need to determine how to
manage the resource, to whom it should be allocated, and how to
solve conflicts related to its exploration. Think again of wind energy,
which is currently a particular growth area in the United States.
Winds, of course, are not new to the Earth. But more recently, they
have been deployed at scale to produce electricity.9 Faced with the
growing use of wind power, state and local policymakers must now
decide how they should manage this resource. Their first alternative,
along the lines of a vertical transplant, would be to borrow from the
regimes at the federal level and apply a rule akin to the Clean Air Act.
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10 See infra Section III.B (discussing the way courts dealt with the challenge of crafting
wind energy law).
11 But see David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law, 2013
BYU L. REV. 1191, 1191 (2013) (discussing natural legal transplants in civil procedure
matters and defining cross-subject as “doctrine that, in form and manner of application,
does not vary from one substantive context to the next”).
12 See infra Section III.B (discussing the construction of wind law).
13 See infra Section II.C.3 (discussing waste management).
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The second alternative, following a horizontal transplant, would be to
copy a rule used by another state. The third alternative, which is the
focus of this Article, is to apply a rule from within the same jurisdiction that previously applied to a different resource. As the case study
below shows, this third alternative best describes what courts and
agencies did when faced with the challenge of conceptualizing wind
rights: They copied the regimes applicable to water or to oil and gas.10
The literature on legal transplants has largely ignored crosssubject borrowing.11 The analysis of vertical and horizontal transplants, on which the current literature focuses, helps us understand
why jurisdictions prefer to borrow an already existing regime instead
of coming up with new rules or doctrines. However, the reasons
offered in the literature do not fully account for internal, cross-subject
transplants where jurisdictions decide to transfer their own rules
between different areas of law.
This Article thus aims to expand the legal transplant umbrella by
laying out the conceptual framework for this third route and illustrating its operation in the context of natural resources. While the case
studies belong to natural resources, the cross-subject transplants we
highlight here extend beyond the domain of natural resources. They
are a common phenomenon in different areas of law. When facing a
new legal question, judges, regulators, or even private parties turn to
other areas of law they are familiar with. They turn to what feels natural and familiar to them, based on a kind of heuristic of availability.
This borrowing from what is familiar translates into borrowing across
subject matters. We call this kind of cross-subject borrowing “natural
transplants.”
Importantly, cross-subject transplants occur within all policymaking institutions. Agencies that need to adopt a new set of rules,
for example, could borrow existing rules from a different resource.
That is precisely what the Bureau of Land Management did when it
needed to put together rules for leasing offshore wind: It used the
blueprint that existed in the context of offshore oil and gas.12 Regulators have similarly used surface mining rules to regulate waste,13 and
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See infra Section II.C.3 (discussing the Clean Air Act).
Murray v. BEJ Mins., LLC, 962 F.3d 485, 486 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Jeremy P.
Jacobs, Mineral Fight Goes Mesozoic: Who Owns Dinosaur Bones?, E&E NEWS (July 8,
2019, 12:11 PM), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060685731 [https://perma.cc/TR5K4DAG] (discussing the holding and implications of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Murray).
16 See Murray, 962 F.3d at 486 (applying the Montana Supreme Court’s conclusions
regarding what constitutes a “mineral” for the purpose of a mineral reservation under state
law in Murray v. BEJ Mins., LLC, 464 P.3d 80, 91 (Mont. 2020)).
17 See infra Section III.A (discussing groundwater).
18 Oil and gas are allocated to the owner of the mineral estate. While the owner of the
surface estate has some soil depth to plant a tree and usually has rights to use groundwater
beneath the property, they do not have the rights to minerals and oil. Adopting an oil and
gas model may not have given the dinosaur bones to the surface estate owner.
19 See Murray, 464 P.3d at 92 (finding dinosaur fossils analogous to limestone); Murray,
962 F.3d at 486 (applying the Montana court’s conclusion).
20 Murray, 464 P.3d at 92.
15

44277-nyu_97-3 Sheet No. 35 Side B

the Clean Air Act, which was originally intended for “conventional”
pollutants, has been used to regulate greenhouse gases.14
Transplanting can occur in the courts as well. A recent case in the
Ninth Circuit considered whether dinosaur bones could and should be
treated like subsurface minerals (i.e., oil and gas) or rather like limestone in order to determine whether the bones belonged to the surface
owner.15 Oil, gas, and dinosaur fossils are all derived from organic
sources and preserved underground for millions of years, but the court
considered that fossils are not always valuable, while oil and gas are.16
Texas follows oil and gas law whenever new questions arise,17 but
Montana, which produces about one percent of the oil Texas produces, deviated from the oil and gas model.18 The court considered
fossils to be closer to limestone, instead.19 Limestone belongs to the
surface owner because, according to the Montana court, it is close to
the surface and, like dinosaur fossils, can be found by scraping the
soil.20 Here, again, the court’s move can best be characterized as a
cross-subject transplant. Importantly, the court is not just reasoning by
analogy; the natural transplant framework we highlight here goes further. Using an analogy neither tells us which example is going to be
adopted, nor by whom, nor why regimes are selected. Analogy also
does not explain the practices of internal borrowing beyond the judiciary. The transplant framework offered here, in contrast, offers a
much richer conceptual analysis of these factors.
What motivates the adoption of natural transplants? Internal,
cross-subject transplants are motivated by several nonexclusive reasons. First, an existing regime may accurately reflect the preferences
of a particular jurisdiction over a particular area of law, and thus copying it would ensure those same preferences are satisfied in another
area. For example, some jurisdictions may be wary of commodifica-
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21 See, e.g., STEVEN JOHNSON, WHERE GOOD IDEAS COME FROM: THE NATURAL
HISTORY OF INNOVATION 25–26 (2010) (explaining how an early incubator for babies was
copied from the incubators used in the Paris Zoo for chickens).
22 Transition costs, broadly understood, may include the costs incurred by all parties
involved who are required to design, draft, and test a new rule or adapt to a new regime;
the costs of building new practices and know-how; the costs of political transition; the costs
of new institutional-capacity building; the increased financial risk of untested rules; error
costs; opportunity costs; and more. The scope and extent of transition costs could vary
from case to case.
23 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases (offering further detail on the availability heuristic), in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 14 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos
Tversky eds., 1982). We use the term heuristic of availability liberally to refer to legal
professionals’ inclination to resort to the rules of salient jurisdictions. The availability
heuristic refers to risk perception. As Cass R. Sunstein states, “[i]f a particular incident is
cognitively ‘available’—both vivid and salient—then people will have a heightened fear of
the risk in question.” Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions Against What? The Availability
Heuristic and Cross-Cultural Risk Perception, 57 ALA. L. REV. 75, 77 (2005).
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tion of certain goods and be reluctant to accept regimes that rely on
private property rights and market transactions. Limits on transferability of agricultural land may be borrowed, for instance, when trying
to ensure speculation does not happen in water rights. Second, the
new regime might happen to be the most efficient for the new
problem. In natural resources, two resources may be scientifically similar and, as a result, applying the same rules to both can produce
desired results. In other words, relying on an existing regime does not
preclude a transplant across areas from being a positive innovation, as
examples beyond the legal system suggest.21 Third, copying the rules
from another resource may be cost-efficient because coming up with a
new rule is expensive at the outset, and the transitional costs of
adapting to a new rule are high.22 An internal transplant ensures that
the legal community is already familiar with the rules and doctrines to
be applied to a novel issue. The legal community may prefer turning
to a resource regime that is salient, as it is one with which they are
more familiar and thus is natural to them. This practice illustrates the
heuristic of availability.23 This heuristic operates as a sort of cognitive
shortcut to help decisionmakers and legal actors. They also cement,
over time, the use of particular transplants over others.
Yet, while there are generally many advantages to transplants,
and particularly natural transplants, just like any other foundational
tradeoffs in law—say, rules versus standards or boilerplate versus nonstandardized contracts—transplants inevitably involve compromises.
The primary risk is transplanting a regime that is inapt for the particular problem at hand. Even if the adoption costs are lower at the
outset, it could be the case that the performance of the transplanted
regime over time would be suboptimal. This could be because the
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24 Coyote Lake Ranch, LLC v. City of Lubbock, 498 S.W.3d 53, 63–64 (Tex. 2016);
Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 831–32 (Tex. 2012).
25 See, e.g., Judon Fambrough, Mixing Oil and Water Law, TEX. REAL EST. RSCH. CTR.
(Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.recenter.tamu.edu/articles/tierra-grande/Mixing-Oil-andWater-Law [https://perma.cc/87X5-GN4A].
26 See infra notes 241–42 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 237–40 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 243–49 and accompanying text.
29 For an analysis of internal borrowing within property law, see Yael R. Lifshitz,
Property Beyond Land, pt. II (2022) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors)
[hereinafter Lifshitz, Property Beyond Land] (discussing the borrowing between land law,
a particular branch of property law, and other domains of property law).
30 See infra Section IV.B.1 (discussing space minerals).
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transplanted regime is ill fitted to the new setting or resource. As an
example, courts in Texas have ignored the scientific differences
between oil and water and applied doctrines from oil and gas to
groundwater,24 despite the potential for detrimental results.25
The same tradeoffs that are embedded in the context of natural
transplants also extend beyond natural resources. They could very
well apply to new regulatory challenges in family law, health law,
labor law, or the regulation of constantly evolving new technologies.
For instance, when state legislatures lagged in regulating the controversial topic of surrogacy, courts applied adoption regulations.26 In
another example, part of the landlord-tenant revolution included
treating leases (which are proprietary) more like contracts, thus
importing contract law doctrines to the regulation of real property.27
Similarly, regulations for corporations were the basis for the regulation of other forms of business associations.28
This Article makes three key contributions to the literature on
legal transplants. First, the Article expands the legal transplants literature by offering a conceptual framework for understanding borrowing
across three dimensions. The framework for unpacking internal legal
transplants explains why they are adopted, which institutions adopt
them, and which subject areas are likely to be the exporting ones.
Second, it focuses in particular on the most understudied type of
transplant—the borrowing that occurs across natural resources or
areas of law within a given jurisdiction. In that sense, the Article also
brings together two strands of literature: the literature on legal transplants and the literature on the mechanisms by which legal rules
evolve or develop internally. Importantly, while the examples used in
this Article focus on natural resource law, internal, cross-subject transplants can be found in many other domains.29 The conceptual framework will shed light on existing and future transplants, such as the
regime for space minerals.30 Third, this Article brings the legal transplants literature to bear, specifically, on natural resource law. While
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natural resource law has been studied in other contexts, the idea of
legal transplants within natural resources has received little scholarly
attention.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews current strands in
the literature on legal transplants and sets forth how this Article
broadens the scope of the legal transplant idea. Part II lays out the
concept of a natural transplant, which focuses on cross-subject borrowing within a jurisdiction. It offers an analytical framework for
understanding why transfers occur, which regimes are borrowed, and
which legal actors are involved in these internal, cross-subject transplants. Part III then illustrates how borrowing occurs across areas of
law within a given jurisdiction. It does so by drawing on two historical
case studies, focusing on two key resources: groundwater, a crucial
source of drinking water, and wind, key to our transition to renewable
energy. Part IV shows the explanatory and predictive power of the
framework. It does so by applying the framework to both past developments in other areas of the law, underscoring that natural transplants are pervasive, and to future regulations in cutting-edge natural
resources areas, such as deep-sea and space minerals.
I
THE LEGAL TRANSPLANT FRAMEWORK

A. Understanding Legal Transplants
The concept of legal transplants has captured the imagination of
scholars and policymakers alike. The idea is typically understood as
the movement of a particular legal rule, or a system of laws, either
from one country to another or from one people to another.31 Much
of the discourse regarding legal transplants has focused on the
dynamics between developed and developing countries and the more

06/13/2022 09:04:56

31 ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 21
(2d ed. 1993) (defining legal transplants as “the moving of a rule or a system of law from
one country to another, or from one people to another”).
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In order to understand natural legal transplants, it is necessary to
first explore the general transplant framework. Natural legal transplants, which are the focus of this Article, are distinct from those analyzed by the transplant literature because they are intrajurisdictional
and cross-subject. Nonetheless, there are commonalities with other
theorized types of transplants that help frame natural legal transplants, explaining both why jurisdictions borrow a doctrine from an
existing resource for a new resource and which doctrines they borrow.
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32 See, e.g., Glen Mola Pumuye, Legal Transplants: A Conflict of Statutory Law and
Customary Law in Papua New Guinea, 4 IALS STUDENT L. REV. 31, 32–33 (2017)
(discussing Papua New Guinea’s borrowing of legislation from Australia).
33 Natasha Affolder, Contagious Environmental Lawmaking, 31 J. ENV’T L. 187, 190
(2019).
34 Some scholars propose that state rules may also be followed at the federal level. See
Alexandra B. Klass, Eminent Domain Law as Climate Policy, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 49, 83
(suggesting state action “can serve as a template for Congress if, in future years, it wishes
to enact federal climate policy”).
35 See Wiener, supra note 4, at 1354 (explaining that whether borrowing is efficient
depends on the receiving state’s criteria for adopting new law).
36 Nuno Garoupa & Anthony Ogus, A Strategic Interpretation of Legal Transplants, 35
J. LEGAL STUD. 339, 345–46 (2006).
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or less voluntary legal borrowing that occurs in this regard.32 But
transplants also occur between neighboring jurisdictions with a similar
level of development. This is the case, for example, with regards to the
international spread of environmental impact assessments.33 U.S.
states, likewise, frequently copy each other.34 Beyond the adoption of
statutes sponsored by the Uniform Law Commission, some states are
trendsetters such that other jurisdictions may copy their regulations
on a particular area.
Copying between jurisdictions is often explained on utilitarian
grounds. From the point of view of the “receiving” state, copying may
be a way to increase efficiency.35 First, and probably most prominently, this could be a result of efficiency gains in the adoption process
itself. The basic idea is that copying is essentially cheaper than crafting
something anew. Of course, the adopting jurisdiction will still face
some adaptation costs. These could include the direct costs of
acquiring information about the rules and implementing them, the
rent-seeking costs by those who resist change and those who do not,
the indirect costs related to the new element imported not being
coherent with the rest of the system, and the costs arising from lack of
innovation since systems without local variations are less likely to
innovate and adjust dynamically.36
The copied rule might also happen to be the best suited for the
problem. Even without copying the rule, it could be the case that regulators, after considering all the factors and getting public input, could
end up with a rule that happens to be just like the copied one. Lastly,
sometimes simply being in unison with neighboring states increases
efficiency. This may be the case if having a coherent set of rules across
jurisdictions will make it easier for various actors to navigate both
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jurisdictions’ regulations, which, for example, might enhance trade or
investment.37
A transplant may also have functional advantages from the
“originating” state’s point of view. For example, if a state sets a particularly demanding environmental regulation which is later copied by
other states,38 the originating state faces less risk of companies fleeing
to other areas with less stringent regulations. If many states have the
same stringent regulations, companies also face fewer costs adapting
to different regimes.39 Furthermore, states may want to have homogeneous rules with their neighboring jurisdictions for other reasons. One
reason is to avoid environmental externalities. If a state’s neighbors
adopt environmental regulations, cross-border externalities may be
reduced, and having the same regime puts everyone on equal footing.
Another reason may be that jurisdictions want to have rules aligned
with the other jurisdictions that belong to their legal culture because it
ensures interoperability.40 It also makes it less likely that a higher regulatory power—such as the federal government in the United States
or the European Union in European nations—will intervene to
homogenize the regulation of a subject.41
1. Which One? Transplant Types
Legal transplants are an umbrella concept that can be defined
across various dimensions, including by reference to the reasons motivating the transplant, or which regime is copied.42 Scholars have identified several types of reasons why a particular jurisdiction would
adopt a transplant, which correspond with the motivations (or per44277-nyu_97-3 Sheet No. 38 Side A
06/13/2022 09:04:56

37 For an account of the reasons why states adopt regulations that are similar, or even
identical, to the regulations adopted by large numbers of other states, see William
Magnuson, The Race to the Middle, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183 (2020).
38 This copying would not be as easy if laws and regulations were protected, as Stephen
Clowney suggests. Nonetheless, protection may help jurisdictions plan carefully for the
adoption of the new regulation, because innovating is costly. Stephen Clowney, Property in
Law: Government Rights in Legal Innovations, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 4 (2011) (“The drafting
and implementation of an untested legal scheme—like the invention of a new commercial
product—may consume substantial resources and entail considerable financial risks for the
innovating government.”).
39 See Magnuson, supra note 37, at 1205 (discussing how corporations benefit from
familiarity among different legal regimes).
40 See id. at 1208–12 (discussing interoperability).
41 See id. at 1212–15 (discussing federal intervention).
42 Transplants are broadly aimed at improving the current legal system or converging
with other legal systems. See Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using
Sociology, Legal History and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51
AM. J. COMPAR. L. 839 (2003) (on the aims of transplants); Affolder, supra note 33, at 203
(on transplants as convergence). However, of course, transplants are far from
homogeneous, as the discussion here shows.
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ceived motivations) to undertake a transplant. The leading typology in
this regard was developed by Jonathan Miller, who categorized transplants by drawing on examples of transplants between developed and
developing countries.43 The first category is cost-saving transplants.
This captures the idea of a jurisdiction wanting to save time and
money by not developing their own solution to a problem.44 Environmental law transplants, in particular, could respond to this model
since some jurisdictions may not have the funds to invest in the
research studies necessary to regulate certain pollutants.45 The second
type is the externally dictated transplant, which implies that some
external power has imposed a full new legal regime or some regulation.46 This category covers anything from a full overhaul of the legal
system after a military conquest to the influence of the International
Monetary Fund or the World Bank.47 These transplants, in particular,
have long been criticized. Critics argue that using the language of
transfers and convergence of legal systems, when talking about the
adoption of rules and doctrines from developed countries by developing countries, masks the politics behind the transplant.48 In particular, using such language can lead some to believe, so goes the
argument, that former colonies see Western regulatory examples as
the only valuable ones.49 In reality, however, the choice of former colonies is often constrained, such that their adoption of Western regulatory examples is not necessarily due to their perceived value but due
to their increased availability.50 As for the efficacy of such transplants,
scholars have claimed that imposed transplants are often
unsuccessful.51
44277-nyu_97-3 Sheet No. 38 Side B
06/13/2022 09:04:56

43 Miller, supra note 42; see also Silvia Ferreri & Larry A. DiMatteo, Terminology
Matters: Dangers of Superficial Transplantation, 37 B.U. INT’L L.J. 35, 54 tbl.1 (2019)
(summarizing examples of transplantation categories in developed nations).
44 Miller, supra note 42, at 845.
45 See id. at 846 (observing that adopting their own standards can be too expensive for
developing nations).
46 Id. at 847.
47 Id.
48 See id. at 847–48 (describing how developing countries have adopted intellectual
property standards or human rights legislation under the threat of trade sanctions from the
United States).
49 See Affolder, supra note 33, at 204 (“Postcolonial tendencies to consider forms of
Western law as the only worthy sources of inspiration and replication persist, often
unnoticed.”).
50 See id. (“Today’s ‘idealistic exporters’ of law may employ ‘unconscious attitudes’ of
universalism that avoid looking behind the ‘good ideas’, and thus unwittingly privilege
certain ideals over others.”).
51 See, e.g., Matteo Solinas, The Nature of Legal Transplants – Inspirations from
Postcolonial Scholarship, 22 NZACL Y.B. 179, 211–13 (2016) (discussing the uneven
staying power of the Napoleonic Code in early nineteenth-century Europe).
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The third type is the entrepreneurial transplant, which focuses on
the mechanism that prompted the transplant. In the entrepreneurial
transplant, the trigger is a group of people, often experts, pushing for
the adoption.52 It can be nongovernmental organizations working on a
particular area, companies aiming at homogenizing the regulatory
frameworks they operate under, or locals educated in the country
where the transplanted rule originated.53
Finally, the fourth type is the legitimacy-generating transplant,
which focuses on the prestige of the originating legal system or rule.54
Even without the colony-metropolis relationship, there is the possibility of certain countries being thought leaders because of their international power position.55 For example, the United States
Environmental Protection Agency’s asbestos regulations have been
adopted in approximately forty countries, even if their environmental
protection regulations are otherwise less robust.56
Finally, some jurisdictions transplant rules from other jurisdictions just to ensure uniformity and interoperability across jurisdic52

Miller, supra note 42, at 849–50.
See id. at 850 (discussing NGOs and locals educated abroad); Magnuson, supra note
37, at 1208 (discussing companies’ interests in familiarity across legal regimes).
54 See EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 62–63 (5th ed. 2003)
(discussing how educators waited to adopt the modern math curriculum until the “most
influential” opinion leaders in education advertised their support for it). The scholars of
legal transplants have criticized prestige. On the one hand, the prestige rationale could
obscure the real reason for a transplant: efficiency. See Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal
Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and Economics, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 8
(1994) (arguing that a movement towards efficiency explains the general convergence of
modern legal systems and that there seems to be a synergy between efficiency and prestige
rationales). On the other hand, it has also been pointed out that prestige is not objective; it
is influenced by ideology and power relationships. See Michele Graziadei, Legal
Transplants and the Frontiers of Legal Knowledge, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 723, 739
(2009) (arguing that prestige is “inscribed in a set of beliefs about the world, about status
and achievement” and must be considered in the “broader domain of the analysis of
ideology”). Ferreri and DiMatteo refine the taxonomy and suggest that there are seven
subtypes of transplants that can be classified in three larger groups: transplantation,
borrowing, and influence. Ferreri & DiMatteo, supra note 43, at 52–54. These subtypes are:
(i) transplantation of a legal tradition; (ii) transplantation of a national law;
(iii) transplantation of an area of law; (iv) double transplantation when “[a] country
transplants a specific area of law and then uses that transplantation in the making of a
broader law”; (v) borrowing of a particular rule or doctrine; (vi) influence from a country’s
law perceived as advanced; and (vii) superficial transplantation when only terminology is
borrowed. Id. at 54 tbl.1.
55 See Garoupa & Ogus, supra note 36, at 347 (discussing how “different legal regimes
and practices may be more or less costly to adopt, depending on their influence,” noting
that influence is “measured by higher switching costs for the more influential country and
lower switching costs for the less influential country,” and stating that a well-known regime
may be generally cheaper for countries to switch to than a brand new one).
56 Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global Environmental Law,
36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615, 621–22 & n.26 (2009).
53
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tions.57 This type of transplant can also occur through a bottom-up
process, where private actors abide by the rules of a certain jurisdiction everywhere they operate. The so-called “Brussels Effect” serves
as an example: International firms that operate in the European
Union find it more efficient to produce all their products following the
European standards, even if they are more stringent, and so the
European Union has unilaterally globalized certain regulations.58
This typology mainly focuses on the reasons why a certain regime
is picked. In reality, of course, the types can be mixed and matched.
Yet, the scholarship on transplants is not limited to studying the particular reasons for adoption. It also extends to where the transplant is
coming from.
As far as the origin of the transplant, the literature generally recognizes two types of transplants. The first type is known as a “horizontal” transplant, which occurs between similarly situated
jurisdictions.59 An illustrative example here is borrowing between
states within the United States. For instance, in 2007, Maryland
became the twelfth state to implement California’s vehicle emissions
standards.60 The second type of transplant is sometimes known as a
“vertical” transplant, which occurs between jurisdictions at different
“echelons” of law, such as national and international law.61 An illustrative example in this strand of scholarship is work by Jonathan
Wiener, who traces how the Kyoto Protocol borrowed the emissions
trading mechanism from national regulations.62 Similarly, in a federal

44277-nyu_97-3 Sheet No. 39 Side B
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57 See Magnuson, supra note 37 (arguing that informational benefits, demand by
constituents for familiar regulations, network effects, and a reduced risk of federal
intervention all drive U.S. states to adopt regulations that are similar to those adopted by a
large number of other states). Examples of cases where states have adopted regulations
that are not particularly the best, but just the most prevalent, include the implementation
of secured transaction regulations that aligned with the Uniform Commercial Code and the
regulation of limited liability companies. Id. at 1222–25.
58 For a theoretical and empirical account of the Brussels Effect, see ANU BRADFORD,
THE BRUSSELS EFFECT: HOW THE EUROPEAN UNION RULES THE WORLD, at xiv–xv
(2020).
59 See Wiener, supra note 4, at 1297 (discussing transplants from one national legal
system to another).
60 States Adopting California’s Clean Cars Standards, MD. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, https://
mde.maryland.gov/programs/air/mobilesources/pages/states.aspx [https://perma.cc/MGC8DLQQ]. Another example is transplants across countries. For example, California water
markets were the inspiration for those in Spain. See Vanessa Casado Pérez, Missing Water
Markets: A Cautionary Tale of Governmental Failure, 23 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 157, 163 (2015)
(discussing how California’s experience with water markets inspired their introduction in
Spain, which faced similar climatological challenges and had similar geographic
characteristics).
61 See Wiener, supra note 4, at 1297, 1303 (describing legal borrowing between national
and international law and between, for example, the United States and individual states).
62 Id. at 1309–10.
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system, the federal level of government may borrow from one of the
subfederal units. For example, provinces in Canada adopted carbon
taxes in advance of the Canadian federal government.63 Taken
together, the categorization of transplants in the literature is largely
based either on the reasons for adopting a transplant or on the origin
jurisdiction of the transplant. Yet none of these categories cover the
cross-subject, i.e. “natural,” transplants which this Article
underscores.
2. Who and How? The Process and Conditions for Success
It is also important to understand the process by which a certain
transplant is adopted. Scholars have studied the conditions necessary
for transplants to achieve the goals that prompted the selection of a
particular regulation and be generally accepted by the receiving community.64 The success of a transplant will depend largely on the criteria and time frame chosen to evaluate its success. Generally, as more
time passes, it becomes more likely that the transplant will fit the
society where it is adopted—both because the regulation may adapt to
suit the context in which it is adopted and because the jurisdiction
may adapt to conform with the regulation.65
Importantly, a key piece in the success of the transplant seems to
be the people behind the transplant.66 Those behind the transplant
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63 See Maxine Joselow, National Carbon Tax Upheld by Canada’s Supreme Court, SCI.
AM. (Mar. 29, 2021), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/national-carbon-taxupheld-by-canadas-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/BA36-BWWY] (noting that the
Canadian Parliament passed the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act in 2018, which
“applied [a carbon tax] to four provinces that had not already enacted prices on
pollution”).
64 Everett Rogers examines five attributes, which are related to the intrinsic technical
characteristics of a legal innovation and the socioeconomic context in which it is adopted,
that generally predict an innovation’s success. The factors are: (i) relative advantage over
other alternative regulations (including the status quo); (ii) compatibility with the
adopter’s preconditions, which relates to the institutions of the jurisdiction that adopts the
rule; (iii) simplicity of the regulation, which makes it easy to understand and use;
(iv) trialability, which allows for experimentation, evaluation, and improvement; and
(v) observability of the transplant’s benefits. ROGERS, supra note 54, at 247–53, 258, 269,
286–88.
65 George Rodrigo Bandeira Galindo understands transplants as taking into account
both space and time. According to Bandeira Galindo, a transplant implies that the country
to which the rule is transplanted wants to achieve some result in the future. George
Rodrigo Bandeira Galindo, Legal Transplants Between Time and Space (“[A] legal
transplant can be viewed as a collection of experiences that happened in one legal system
and are expected to be realized in the future in a different legal system.”), in
ENTANGLEMENTS IN LEGAL HISTORY: CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES 129, 133 (Thomas Duve
ed., 2014).
66 See Affolder, supra note 33, at 208–10 (arguing that scholars can better understand
the transportation of legal norms by focusing on the influence of individual legal actors);
Graziadei, supra note 54, at 725 (advocating for looking not only at “macro” explanations
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may be academics trained in a foreign country, public servants convinced of the good qualities of the foreign rule, or special interests
who may be favored by the rule. Those favoring the transplants and
contributing to the harmonization of the new rule with the existing
legal system have been called “transferists.”67 However, the risk of a
transplant championed by a particular group (often, an intellectual or
economic elite) is that it may not filter through to the broader population.68 This focus on the human aspect of legal transplants, in particular the communities that facilitate such transplants, aligns nicely with
our focus on the heuristics of availability within the legal community,
as discussed below.
Finally, the literature on legal transplants has made clear that
transplants are not just a “one-size-fits-all” technocratic mechanism.69
Interjurisdictional transplants have to rise above and adapt to differences in culture,70 political and judicial systems,71 distributions of
power,72 geography, religion, political economy, and norms.73 The
complexity of this process is even greater when a developed country’s
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of why transplants occur but also at the “micro” level of the individual actions that
influence how transplants are implemented).
67 Marı́a Paula Reyes Gaitán, The Challenges of Legal Transplants in a Globalized
Context: A Case Study on “Working” Examples (Oct. 2014) (LL.M. dissertation,
University of Warwick) (manuscript at 16), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2530811 [https://
perma.cc/YEU2-N872]; see also Basil C. Bitas, Comparative Theory, Judges and Legal
Transplants: A Practical Lesson from Singapore and Its Relevance to Transnational
Convergence, 26 SING. ACAD. L.J. 50, 52–54 (2014) (reviewing existing academic work by
members of the “transferist school” and scholars with other theoretical orientations).
68 See Jan Torpman & Fredrik J örgensen, Legal Effectiveness: Theoretical
Developments on Legal Transplants, 91 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE
[ARSP] [ARCHIVES FOR PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY] 515, 516 (2005)
(arguing that “[c]ountries transplanting modern law have experienced a rising gap between
public and professionals . . . [and] law in the books and law in action” and have seen “lower
degrees of involvement among the population in political processes creating legal
change”).
69 See Randall Peerenboom, Toward a Methodology for Successful Legal Transplants, 1
CHINESE J. COMPAR. L. 4, 5–7 (2013) (discussing how existing research on legal transplants
has focused on common best practices, rather than differentiating between countries based
on their unique challenges).
70 See Oscar G. Chase, Legal Processes and National Culture, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMPAR. L. 1, 1–2 (1997) (arguing that cultural differences “present formidable barriers
that should not be ignored” in evaluating proposed legal transplants).
71 See Mattei, supra note 54, at 17 (“[A] potentially efficient doctrine may be deprived
of any impact if it is introduced in an incompatible machinery of justice.”).
72 See O. Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1,
12–13 (1974) (arguing that variations in the power structures between one country and
another can prevent or frustrate the transfer of legal institutions between them).
73 See Wiener, supra note 4, at 1357 (“Skeptics of transnational borrowing . . . argue
that it must overcome significant differences in national culture, geography, wealth,
religion, political system, economic system, distribution of power, interest group pressures
and norms.”).
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regimes are applied to developing countries without tweaking them to
suit the likely cultural and institutional differences. A transplant will
be most successful when applied to a jurisdiction with extremely similar characteristics to the jurisdiction of origin unless the transplant is
adapted to the particularities of the new jurisdiction. It is unlikely that
a purely direct import would result in a successful transplant. A transplant without any attention to the particularities of a jurisdiction is
likely to be rejected, in the short or in the long term. Legal transplants
evolve in the same way that a transplanted organ does in the human
body: They adapt to the new jurisdiction and the new jurisdiction may
adapt to them.74 However, it is important to note that in many cases,
transplants are implemented to jumpstart wider processes of social
change.75 Increasingly, transplants happen between systems that
already have a lot in common,76 thus requiring less adaptation. In general, transplants have become very common occurrences in the development of the law.77
B. Weaving Together the Natural Resource Governance
Frameworks and Legal Transplants

06/13/2022 09:04:56

74 See WATSON, supra note 31, at 27 (“A successful legal transplant – like that of a
human organ – will grow in its new body, and become part of that body . . . . Subsequent
development in the host system should not be confused with rejection.”). For a comment
on Watson’s rejection of mirror theories of law (theories that law is the mirror of the
context external to the law), see William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The
Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 489 (1995).
75 See David Nelken, Comparatists and Transferability, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL
STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 437, 455 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday
eds., 2003) (“In transnational legal transfers, however, it is typical for law to be asked to
jump-start the wider process of social change and leap-frog over long-standing social and
cultural obstacles.”).
76 Graziadei, supra note 54, at 727.
77 Id. at 733.
78 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS
& PROC.) 347, 350–51 (1967) (broadly maintaining that property rights evolve when the
benefits of establishing such rights exceed the costs associated with the property regime).
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Scholarship on natural resources, in the last few decades, has
dealt with issues of first impression largely under the Demsetzian
framework. In his seminal work, Harold Demsetz used an example of
North American rights in fur, and their evolution, to argue that property rights will emerge in a particular resource when the benefits from
creating and enforcing rights begin to outweigh the costs associated
with such regimes.78 A Demsetzian analysis is thus particularly concerned with the question of when a property rights regime in a particular resource will develop (and when not).
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A rich body of scholarship has sprung up in the wake of
Demsetz’s analysis.79 Some scholars relate Demsetz’s theory to the
more general notion of efficiency, claiming that “[t]he Demsetz thesis
can be seen as an anticipation of the idea that the common law
evolves toward efficient rules.”80 Other scholars maintain that
Demsetz’s account can be linked to the views of earlier scholars such
as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.81
Much of the scholarship following in Demsetz’s footsteps can be
seen through the lens of transaction costs. The literature often focuses
on the different types of transaction costs and highlights the significance of these costs in encouraging or impeding the creation of property and, by extension, other types of regimes as well. One particularly
prominent cost that has been repeatedly emphasized in the literature
relates to the price of defining and enforcing particular regimes.82
79
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See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Cowboys and Contracts, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. S489 (2002) (applying Demsetz’s theory to property rights in unowned or unpriced
attributes of a resource and arguing that entrepreneurs contract to define and enforce their
rights to such attributes); Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. S359 (2002) (applying the Demsetzian theory to land); Gary D. Libecap &
James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights in the United States,
31 J. LEGAL STUD. S589, S590 (2002) (applying the Demsetzian theory to oil and natural
gas); David B. Schorr, Appropriation as Agrarianism: Distributive Justice in the Creation of
Property Rights, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 3 (2005) (discussing the Demsetzian analysis with
regards to water); Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution
of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 135–36 (2005) (applying and expanding upon
Demsetz’s theory in a case study of rights in coastal fisheries).
80 Thomas W. Merrill, The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. S331, S331 (2002). For a similar argument that the “emergence of property
rights thus tends toward a use of resources that maximizes social value,” see Thomas W.
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J.L. & ECON.
(SPECIAL ISSUE) S77, S79 (2011).
81 See, e.g., James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 139, 149–50 (2009) (discussing the similarities and differences between
Demsetz’s account and Hobbes’s and Locke’s views). For another analysis of the gaps in
Demsetz’s evolutionary theory, see Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives
from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37 (1990).
82 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for
Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S462–63 (2002) (discussing how the
marginal costs of definition and enforcement of property should equal their marginal
benefits under Demsetz’s theory); Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of
Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 165 (1975) (applying
a similar economic model to property rights definition and enforcement activities). See
generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (2000) (arguing that a
standardized set of property rights reduces the “measurement costs” related to defining
and enforcing those rights); Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context,
and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1108–10 (2003) (arguing that formalistic property
devices can minimize the “[p]rocessing costs” to third parties of recognizing and respecting
property rights).
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The main critique of the Demsetzian framework focuses on the
extent to which changing costs can truly account for shifts in property
regimes (or resistances to shifts for that matter). Prominent critics,
such as Katrina Wyman, argue that transaction costs alone cannot
fully explain the development of property rights but rather that political choices often better explain the evolution of property.83
Circling back to the choices in resource governance, and particularly when a new resource comes about or new uses require reassessing, a Demsetzian framework (and other frameworks that
followed in its wake) focuses primarily on the question of when a
resource regime will emerge. But, importantly for our purposes, the
framework does not speak directly to the question of whether a
regime would be copied from one context to another, nor which
regime would be chosen for copying. These questions remain open.
We aim to fill this gap by weaving together the natural resource literature and the legal transplants literature.84
II
NATURAL TRANSPLANTS
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83 Wyman, supra note 79, at 136; see also David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman,
Fracking as a Test of the Demsetz Property Rights Thesis, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 845, 893–97
(2020) (showing, in accordance with Wyman’s claim, that regulatory capture, legislative
and judicial politics, and legal tradition, rather than purely transaction costs, explain the
lack of regulatory action in the context of fracking).
84 One could argue, on a high level of generality, that a Demsetzian framework does
provide answers to the question of whether a regime will be copied—the answer, so goes
the argument, lies in the analysis of the relevant costs. According to this argument, a
Demsetzian framework would predict that a particular regime would be copied when the
benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. This assumption, regarding benefits outweighing
the costs, is largely shared by the legal transplants literature as well. So at a high level of
generality, the Demsetzian framework is in line with the legal transplants literature. But
again, this high level of generality does not give us much by way of predicting which regime
will be selected, and how.
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This Article seeks to broaden the framework of horizontal legal
transplants in two directions. First, it shows that legal borrowing may
happen within a jurisdiction, not just between jurisdictions. Second, it
shows that legal transplants do not need to happen within a single
substantive area. While many transplants may entail transferring a
rule or doctrine within the same substantive area, there are also cases
where a legal doctrine is transferred to another area of law. This
Article uses examples from natural resources to elucidate the concept
of cross-subject, intrajurisdictional transplants, but these kinds of
transplants are not limited to natural resources. In particular, we are
looking at issues of first impression where doctrines from another
resource have been applied—be they either newly discovered, newly
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relevant natural resources in need of regulation or new questions
about existing resources that became contentious at one point.
The case studies underscore a third, as of yet understudied, type
of transplant—one that occurs within the same jurisdiction between
types of resources or subject matters. Beyond its descriptive capacity,
the transplant framework is helpful in its explanatory power. It highlights why this kind of borrowing occurs, what is borrowed, and who is
primarily engaged in borrowing.
A. Why Do We Borrow?
Why do we borrow? Policymakers have more than one option for
how to govern a particular resource. In that sense, regimes can be
seen as “competing” with each other. So why choose an internal,
cross-substance transplant as opposed to designing a completely new
regime or copying from another jurisdiction? A first explanation
relates to particular preferences pertaining to natural resources. Natural resource governance is an area where sovereignty concerns tend
to be prominent,85 and jurisdictions may aim at discouraging foreign
investment by making the entry into a new legal system costly. Regulating a new resource in a way that is similar to an existing resource
provides those already operating in the jurisdiction with an advantage
over those who might seek to enter from without. The existing actors
benefit from existing knowledge and know-how, as compared to
external investors. This kind of policy preference encapsulates a form
of natural resources parochialism, often also referred to as natural
resources protectionism.86 Jurisdictions may also want a regime that
44277-nyu_97-3 Sheet No. 42 Side B
06/13/2022 09:04:56

85 For example, foreign investors are not allowed to invest in minerals in federal lands,
and the Mineral Leasing Act only allows foreign investors to do so by owning stock in a
United States corporation. Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-146, § 1, ch. 85, 41
Stat. 437, 437–38 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 181) (denying citizens of another
country ownership over any lease under the Act when the “laws, customs or regulations”
of the other country “deny similar or like privileges to citizens or corporations of this
country” but permitting the disposition of leases to corporations organized under the laws
of the United States); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-320, FOREIGN
INVESTMENT: LAWS AND POLICIES REGULATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN 10 COUNTRIES
(2008), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-08-320 [https://perma.cc/MYN4-W7P9]
(reviewing how major foreign investors in the United States, among other countries,
regulate foreign investment in their own countries).
86 For an illustration of the tensions between protectionism and sustainability in
regulating the use of Great Lakes water, see Christine A. Klein, The Law of the Lakes:
From Protectionism to Sustainability, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1259, 1260, 1278. For a
discussion of the differences between protectionism and protecting public access to water
resources, see Vanessa Casado Pérez, Whose Water? Corporatization of a Common Good,
in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, DISRUPTED 79, 92 (Keith Hirokawa & Jessica Owley eds., 2021).
Another example of protectionism relates to the proposed Canadian Great Recycling and
Northern Development (GRAND) Canal, which would have dammed James Bay to collect

44277-nyu_97-3 Sheet No. 43 Side A

06/13/2022 09:04:56

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\97-3\NYU303.txt

June 2022]

unknown

NATURAL TRANSPLANTS

Seq: 21

8-JUN-22

14:51

953

reflects the jurisdiction’s preferences for natural resource development, which may be different from their neighbors’ preferences.87 For
example, a jurisdiction may prefer allowing market mechanisms to
allocate natural resources. In such a jurisdiction, copying a private
property rights trading scheme used for one resource and applying it
to another may be a good solution. Instead, if the jurisdiction prefers
to channel exploration and development of resources via governmental licenses, and not property rights, they could already have
licensing systems in place. Extending the existing licensing mechanisms to “new” resources could help, for instance, by reducing agency
costs and capitalizing on existing institutional capacity and know-how.
The second possible explanation for transplanting focuses on efficiency gains. A regime borrowed from a different resource may be
best suited for the new natural resource in question, given the similarities between resources. For example, minerals in space could be
deemed similar to any other mineral on Earth, and, accordingly, we
could apply similar rules to the two minerals. To be sure, there are no
two resources that are the same, and whatever characteristic is
deemed salient is subject to a certain degree of subjectivity. Whether
or not these efficiency gains materialize is, of course, an empirical and
highly case-specific matter.
Relatedly, there could be efficiency gains related to the transition
costs involved in adopting a new regime.88 Transition costs, as our discussion of the evolution of regimes in natural resources will show,89
can be a significant factor in determining whether, or when, change
44277-nyu_97-3 Sheet No. 43 Side A
06/13/2022 09:04:56

water wasted in the Quebec River and pump it south to the Great Lakes and Mississippi
River. J. Owen Saunders, Trade Agreements and Environmental Sovereignty: Case Studies
from Canada, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1171, 1181 (1995). This project prompted the
parties to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to make clear through
joint statements that the agreement did not generate any right to the water resources of the
parties. Id. at 1182–83. The North American Water and Power Alliance (NAWPA or
NAWAPA) is another project that implied taking Canadian water into the United States,
and the Army Corps of Engineers envisioned channelling water from Alaska and the
Canadian Northwest through the Rocky Mountain trench to replenish the Colorado and
the Mississippi systems. Id. at 1181. This behavior also exists at a smaller scale. See id. at
1184 (discussing Ontario’s protectionist Water Transfer Control Act of 1989).
87 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 85, at 3 (summarizing
countries’ differing approaches to regulating foreign investment, including policies
concerning investment in the energy sector and natural resources).
88 As mentioned, the term “transition costs” could—broadly—encompass a wide range
of costs, including the costs of designing, drafting, testing, and implementing a new regime;
the costs of adapting to a new regime, including building new practices and know-how;
building new institutional capacity; increased financing costs, opportunity costs; and more.
Just as with the other types of efficiency-related trade-offs, the extent and scope of these
costs is an empirical, and highly case-specific matter.
89 See infra Section II.B.
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90 See Garoupa & Ogus, supra note 36, at 347 (“[A] regime that is well known and used
may be cheaper to switch to than a brand-new regime.”).
91 See infra notes 113–17 and accompanying text. This is a difference between vertical
and horizontal transplants. In vertical transplants between national and international law,
international lawyers are borrowing from that which they may not be familiar. See Wiener,
supra note 4, at 1349–50 (describing how entrepreneurial “change agents,” such as NGOs
or academics, not just lawyers, often play a crucial role in executing transplants between
national and international law).
92 See supra notes 69–77 and accompanying text.
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happens. For example, copying a regime, instead of designing a new
one, saves costs because there is less need for preliminary studies.
Copying an existing regime reduces the costs for all those involved
(whether private parties, courts, or administrators) who would otherwise need to learn and adapt to a new regime and build new institutional capacity, practices, and know-how. Borrowing may also save
time when a new regime needs to be in place quickly, either because
the judiciary needs to decide on a case before it or because an executive branch agency is influenced by current legislation and finds it
quicker to resort to the toolkit available.
When the borrowing is internal, albeit cross-subject, there are
further savings. The legal community of that jurisdiction is already
familiar with the existing regime, and, therefore, they face fewer
upfront costs of learning the operation of the new rules or doctrines.90
This is particularly true when the transplant occurs between two natural resources, as lawyers practicing in the area of natural resources
may work across several resources.91
Natural transplants also have potential to be more readily
accepted. A transplant “succeeds” when it is not rejected. Transplants
of natural resources doctrines are likely to be accepted both because
of their intrajurisdictional nature and because of the characteristics of
natural resources law. First, intrajurisdictional transplants avoid many
of the pitfalls of interjurisdictional transplants. As stated, the main
challenges for transfers of legal doctrines between jurisdictions are the
political, economic, and social differences.92 Interjurisdictional legal
transplants need to both adapt to the context in the new jurisdiction
and, often, be a motor of change. Intrajurisdictional transplants
should not need to adapt to different circumstances, although there is
the possibility that the communities exploiting and affected by a particular natural resource may be different. Furthermore, as explained
above, there is a community who will likely be constant across
resources: the legal community specializing in natural resources.
Second, natural resources law is an area where transplants could be
accepted given the tight control that government agencies have over
most natural resources and because the level of private intermediation

44277-nyu_97-3 Sheet No. 44 Side A

06/13/2022 09:04:56

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\97-3\NYU303.txt

June 2022]

unknown

Seq: 23

8-JUN-22

NATURAL TRANSPLANTS

14:51

955

is relatively low.93 However, “success” is difficult to measure. Every
rule evolves once introduced into a system. Even an ill-fitted one may
remain in the system, and both the rule and the responses to it may
adapt.
B. What Do We Borrow?: Heuristic of Availability
We identify two factors that contribute to the determination of
which resource law a jurisdiction may borrow from: similarities
between the resources, saliency, or a combination of both. A salient
resource, in this context, is one that is most common in a particular
jurisdiction or one which is economically prominent in the jurisdiction.94 In Texas, for example, oil is probably the most intuitively
salient resource. Thus, if a new resource were to be allocated in Texas
(especially if that new resource happened to share a few characteristics with oil), rules regarding oil are the ones likely to be transferred.
When a new resource or a new legal challenge emerges, lawyers,
courts, and policymakers intuitively rely on what they know best and
apply it to the new problem. Salience could also be seen as an illustration of the heuristic of availability.95 It could also be seen as a form of
path dependence.96 Literature on path dependence shows that as
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93 See Garoupa & Ogus, supra note 36, at 355–57, 356 tbl.4 (discussing how
“harmonization” of legal regimes is likely to take place in administrative and regulatory
law, where private intermediation is low).
94 See Henry E. Smith, The Elements of Possession (discussing how resource use and
considerations of value and efficiency can make features “prominent and attention
grabbing” and therefore salient), in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION 65, 66, 84, 93
(Yun-Chien Chang ed., 2015). The idea of “salience” is also reinforced by Robert Sudgen
and his work on focal points, which are points of salience that offer solutions to
cooperation games. ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION AND
WELFARE 49–51 (2d ed. 2005); see also Lifshitz, Property Beyond Land, supra note 29
(manuscript at 4–5) (discussing the connection between the idea of salience and focal point
solutions in the case of land).
95 See supra note 23.
96 Path dependence refers, broadly, to the idea that history matters: Choices made in
the past constrain our set of choices in the present. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Path
Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law
System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 604 (2001) (stating that path dependence “entails . . . a
causal relationship between stages in a temporal sequence, with each stage strongly
influencing the direction of the following stage”); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial
Courts I: Path-Dependence, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 169, 180–81 (1992) (discussing how
a strong principle of stare decisis contributes to making judicial decisions path dependent
and also predictable and fair); Richard R. Nelson, Recent Evolutionary Theorizing About
Economic Change, 33 J. ECON. LITERATURE 48, 50–51 (1995) (“[T]he process of evolution
is strongly path dependent and there is no unique selection equilibrium. Any ‘optimizing’
characteristics of what exists therefore must be understood as local and myopic . . . .”);
Karrigan S. Börk, An Evolutionary Theory of Administrative Law, 72 SMU L. REV. 81, 86
(2019) (arguing that the development of administrative law mimics a path-dependent
biological evolution and examining the implementation of the Endangered Species Act as
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areas of the law evolve, they remain constrained by existing regulations and institutions, making it difficult to start with a clean slate.97 In
some cases, the legal actor may not have any other choice. The
Environmental Protection Agency facing congressional inaction
needed to use the Clean Air Act framework after Massachusetts v.
EPA was decided.98
Path dependencies could lead to a particular resource being more
salient than others. Regarding natural legal transplants, it is often the
case that those who practice in, adjudicate, or regulate one resource
may also work on a new resource requiring a new solution,99 and, as
such, they may turn to what is familiar to them, which illustrates the
heuristic of availability.100
Consider again the example of Texas: As mentioned, in Texas, the
dominant industry is oil and gas, and, accordingly, oil and gas law is a
particularly prevalent source of transplant.101 Saliency in this context
is also a result of the training and experience of the legal community.
As noted above, natural resource lawyers often work across multiple
areas and are likely to have more experience in the most common or
most valuable resource in the community.102
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a case study); Amy L. Stein, Breaking Energy Path Dependencies, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 559,
559–60 (2017) (using path-dependency theory to explain how energy law perpetuates the
use of fossil-fuel resources and identify mechanisms for promoting clean energy
development).
97 See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV.
641, 642–43 (1996) (analyzing path dependence and how it overlaps with other paradigms
of the evolutionary theory of law). Roe also questions the law and economics claim that
the regulations that survive are efficient and claims that lasting regulations can be related
to path dependence or may have been efficient for the conditions at time of enactment but
not at present time. Id. at 641–44; see Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory,
Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 913, 921 (2005) (reviewing theories that
examine how inefficient regulations arise because of selection, self-assembly, and
emergence); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of
Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 806–09 (2003)
(discussing the problem of “conflicting constraints” imposed by regulations, where
changing a single legal rule can lead to unanticipated consequences on the overall
effectiveness of the legal system); Gail Charnley & E. Donald Elliott, Risk Versus
Precaution: Environmental Law and Public Health Protection, 32 ENV’T L. REP. 10363,
10365 (2002) (“Environmental health regulation is path-dependent: actions taken now
affect the nature of actions taken later. Governments may not be able to ‘roll back’ citizen
protections in the face of charges from environmental advocates even if the original actions
turn out to have been unnecessary or ineffective.”).
98 See infra notes 118–27 and accompanying text.
99 See infra notes 111–15 and accompanying text.
100 See Sunstein, supra note 23, at 87–88 (explaining how people assess the magnitude of
risks by turning to what examples come to mind, which are influenced by familiarity,
culture, and social context).
101 See infra Section III.A (discussing Texas courts’ use of oil law to adjudicate
groundwater disputes).
102 See supra note 91 (discussing the expertise of international actors besides lawyers).
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The behavior of the legal community in this context, however, is
not limited to the experience of private attorneys. It can also be
observed in government actors. If one lawyer was working in coal
mining in a state’s environmental agency and is transferred to the
waste program, this lawyer may well import regulatory frameworks
from surface mining into waste when asked to prepare a new
regulation.103
C. Who Borrows?

103

06/13/2022 09:04:56

See infra Section II.C.3 (discussing waste management).
For a comment on the input received during notice-and-comment rulemaking by
agencies and the potential changes in the proposed regulation as a result of stakeholder
input, see Public Notice and Comment Rulemaking (United States), ORG. FOR ECON.
COOP. & DEV., https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/USA-Public-Notice-andComment.pdf [https://perma.cc/HWY8-VKNM].
105 See Wiener, supra note 4, at 1359 (arguing that capture may cause inefficient
regulations when legislatures adopt legal rules from other jurisdictions).
106 See id. (“Judicial adoption of legal rules may be inefficient because judges have high
information costs . . . .”).
104
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An important factor in the choice of who effectuates a transplant
is the forum in which transplanting occurs. Transplanting within the
legislature or an agency may be even more prominent than if it happens in the courthouse, where the procedure would be adversarial.
When a problem with a new resource is litigated in court, one party
may argue that the resource is more like another resource governed
by a doctrine favoring the interests of the said party, while the other
side will argue similarly in favor of the doctrine which governs a different resource. In the legislature or executive branches, we expect
the deliberation procedure to engage with a broader set of stakeholders and draw from a larger pool of regulatory ideas.104 In the
absence of regulatory capture,105 a legislature or the executive branch
is expected to produce regulations applicable across all cases, with a
long-term view. In contrast, judges and attorneys are constrained by
the facts of the case before them and may lack the capacity to systematically study a subject area. For example, if a court is tasked with
developing a new doctrine over a recently discovered natural
resource, the information costs106 judges face may prevent them from
considering all the long-term effects and the application of the rule to
situations that differ from the case at hand. The next Section will start
by looking at judicial proceedings to highlight the similarities and differences between the natural transplants framework and legal
analogy. It will then review examples of transplants in the other
branches.
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1. The Judicial Branch: Analogy and Transplants
One may wonder whether the borrowing highlighted here is
really just a manifestation of the common law practice of reasoning by
analogy.107 It is not. We resist this simplification for three main
reasons.
First, in the courtroom, analogy may be the vehicle by which
transplanting happens, but it does not capture the full breadth and
depth of the broader phenomenon of transplanting.108 While the term
analogy means, roughly, that an idea from one context is used in
another, this definition in itself has very limited explanatory power. It
does not tell us, for example, which regime will be chosen, by whom,
or why. The transplant framework offered here, in contrast, offers a
much richer conceptual analysis of these factors. We aim to begin
filling the explanatory gap (albeit, for now, only in the specific context
of natural resources) by referring to the idea of saliency and the heuristic of availability.
Second, and relatedly, the idea of analogy misses an important
message of the transplant literature: Sometimes borrowing works well,
and sometimes it does not. Analogical reasoning does not speak
directly to whether the borrowing is justified, successful, or useful.
The concept of transplanting is also much broader than an analogy.
The former indicates a broader adoption of systems and rules,
whereas the latter is limited to similarities between particular cases.109
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107 See Brian N. Larson, Law’s Enterprise: Argumentation Schemes & Legal Analogy, 87
U. CIN. L. REV. 663, 679–80 (2019) (describing how reasoning by legal analogy involves
identifying relevant similarities between instant and prior cases based on rules or general
principles).
108 For a recent articulation of the process of analogical reasoning in the court system,
see Cass R. Sunstein, Analogical Reasoning 1 (Harv. Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. 2139, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3938546 [https://perma.cc/QPC3-76DP].
109 When reasoning by analogy, we pull upon similarities of existing case law or
statutory interpretations and apply them to a specific fact pattern. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1–2 (1949). When it comes to case law, we typically
see a particular phrase generalized through reasoning by analogy. Id. at 8. Legal concepts
end up applying to a wide range of cases because a multitude of similarities have been
identified. Thus, this constant analogizing and expansion can result in the “breakdown” of
rules. Id. at 9. Breakdown occurs when the application of the rule has become so broad
through the use of analogy that the original, specific doctrine no longer exists. Id. Levi here
suggests that the rule is no longer the same across subject matters even if they nominally
use the same concept. The application of the rule of capture to water, see infra Section
III.A; foxes, see Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 177–80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (finding that
hunter who killed and removed a wild fox established a property right in it); whales, see
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
191–206 (1991) (discussing how whaling norms led to several property rules that were
variations of the rule of capture); or baseballs, see Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL
31833731, at *2, *8–9 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002) (finding that both litigants established
equal possessory interests in a baseball during a scrum to catch it and ordering the parties
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Third, and no less importantly, the term analogy is primarily
court-focused, whereas the practice of natural transplanting is not limited to courts. It occurs across institutions and includes legislators,
agencies, and private individuals, as the next Sections show.
2. Natural Transplanting in the Legislature
Prior appropriation is the regime that governs the allocation of
water use rights in the Western United States. It is a doctrine born in
the customs of mining camps.110 “First in time, first in right” was the
doctrine applied to minerals, so when mining camps had to decide
how to allocate water, the same principle applied. Courts acknowledged and accepted this doctrine for the first time in Irwin v.
Phillips.111 Later, most state legislatures moved to adopt prior
appropriation.112
3. Transplanting Within the Executive Branch
Agencies usually work across different areas, and administrators
may hold different job positions, in different subject matters, over
time. As such, they may be biased towards the resource they have
more experience with. Consider the following example, which is based
on an interview we conducted: An administrator worked in the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources for more than
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to equally divide the proceeds from the baseball’s sale), may well illustrate this point. That
said, the cases reviewed in this paper have not caused a breakdown of the rules, such as,
the ownership in place. Analogy is, thus, a mechanism through which natural transplants
happen.
110 The system of prior appropriation was first articulated in Irwin v. Phillips, when the
California Supreme Court acknowledged, “[t]he miner who selects a piece of ground to
work, must take it as he finds it, subject to prior rights.” 5 Cal. 140, 147 (1855).
Accordingly, miners who selected riparian land previously subjected to water diversion
could not prevent others from diverting the water in the future. Id. To the contrary, miners
who selected riparian land where water had never been diverted could prevent others from
diverting the water in the future. Id. In contrast, in the Eastern United States, water was
allocated based on the English doctrine of riparianism, which was well-suited for the humid
areas of the first colonies, but much less so for the West where average rainfall was much
lower and use of water beyond riparian lands was a necessity. See BARTON H. THOMPSON,
JR., JOHN D. LESHY, ROBERT H. ABRAMS & SANDRA B. ZELLMER, LEGAL CONTROL OF
WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS 194–95 (6th ed. 2018) (describing how
Western states slowly transitioned from the “traditional common-law riparian system” to
“specific statutory scheme[s] for allocating its surface water”).
111 See THOMPSON, JR. ET AL., supra note 110, at 195 n.30; see also Denise D. Fort, Prior
Appropriation, WATER ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.waterencyclopedia.com/Po-Re/PriorAppropriation.html [https://perma.cc/99NR-MTVM].
112 THOMPSON, JR. ET AL., supra note 110, at 195–98 (noting that while “early
legislatures . . . typically adopted either variants of the riparian doctrine or more general
equitable allocation schemes,” by the start of the 1860s, and especially by the 1870s, courts
and legislatures increasingly saw the attractions of the appropriation system).
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a decade, first in the Bureau of Regulatory Council and then in the
Bureau of Waste Management. In the first position, he worked on surface mining; in the second, in waste management.113 When tasked to
deal with municipal and industrial non-hazardous waste, he borrowed
ideas from surface mining and introduced them in the waste regulations.114 For example, the notice and participation requirements or the
separation between permit and operating requirements were borrowed. Surface mining and waste have issues in common; for example,
both require moving soil.115 However, his knowledge of surface
mining regulations clearly played a role in his decision to transplant
elements of the mining regime to waste regulations.116 Nonetheless,
this was not a copy-and-paste situation; rather, content-specific subject matter was introduced. At times, the language of surface mining
regulation, in issues like notice, could be used; in other matters, surface mining regulations provided the organizational framework that
then was filled with content specific to waste. The result was a very
clear waste regulation.117
Sometimes a natural transplant is the most viable option for
administrators faced with legislative inaction. For example, when the
Environmental Protection Agency had to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions, the only toolkit available was the one offered by the Clean
Air Act.118 This statute did not originally envision the regulation of
carbon dioxide or methane. Instead, the Clean Air Act was passed to
regulate conventional pollutants, even if the statute’s words are
ambiguous.119 The Environmental Protection Agency could not use
44277-nyu_97-3 Sheet No. 46 Side B
06/13/2022 09:04:56

113 Video Conference Interview with John Dernbach, Professor, Widener Univ.
Commonwealth L. Sch. (May 2021).
114 Id.
115 See, e.g., 25 PA. CODE §§ 86.134(4), 271.3(c), 299.160(a) (2021).
116 Video Conference Interview with John Dernbach, supra note 113.
117 Id.
118 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 512–13, 532 (2007) (holding that the Clean
Air Act requires the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions even though drafters of the
statute might not have anticipated it would be used for that purpose).
119 See 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (stating that one purpose of the statute was to generally
“promote the public health and welfare” in response to urban and industrial developments,
as well as increased use of cars). The Clean Air Act was enacted to deal with the rampant
air pollution the United States suffered in the mid-twentieth century. See JAMES SALZMAN
& BARTON H. THOMPSON, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 111–13 (4th ed. 2014)
(suggesting that Congress initially intended for the Clean Air Act to regulate pollutants
that pose health risks, such as smog, nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, and
other hazardous air contaminants, many of which were released into the air from urban
centers). Greenhouse gases were not part of the initial pollutants the Clean Air Act was
enacted to regulate. While the EPA had denied that the Clean Air Act covered greenhouse
gases, the Supreme Court allowed their regulation under the Clean Air Act in
Massachusetts v. EPA, in what has been described as a “watershed moment.” Mark C.
Bond, Can and Should Greenhouse Gases Be Regulated as Hazardous Air Pollutants Under
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tools such as a carbon tax or cap-and-trade,120 the gold standard for
greenhouse gases, due to congressional inaction. Instead, the Agency
had to use the Clean Air Act,121 despite the fact that it did not originally conceive of greenhouse gases as pollutants.
There are numerous differences between greenhouse gases and
conventional pollutants, which poses a challenge for the EPA because
the tools available under the Clean Air Act were not optimized to
deal with greenhouse gases.122 While the EPA had to use the same
regulatory apparatus to deal with greenhouse gases, modifications
were necessary. Conventional pollutants, for one, are local, while
carbon dioxide is global. Another difference is the level of emissions
for each of these pollutants. In 2011, for example, the EPA promulgated the Light-Duty Vehicle Rule regulating fuel efficiency and
greenhouse gas standards for mobile sources.123 By regulating greenhouse gases as pollutants, the regulation of stationary sources under
the Clean Air Act was triggered.124 The Clean Air Act required
“major” stationary sources to be regulated.125 However, the caliber of
“major” was measured based on conventional pollutants and thus
applied to facilities emitting 100 or 250 tons per year, much lower than
the amount of greenhouse gases normally emitted.126 The EPA had to
adapt and tailor the requirements for stationary sources to greenhouse
gases to 100,000 tons per year.127
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Clean Air Act Sec. 112?, 28 ENV’T CLAIMS J. 18, 19 (2016). The words in a statute are given
by the legislature and carry a heavy weight. See LEVI, supra note 109, at 54 (noting how
statutory silence on certain issues is sometimes interpreted as an intentional move by a
legislature). However, there are many reasons why a legislature might purposefully leave a
statute ambiguous, such as high pressure to pass the bill or inability to foresee every case in
which the statute will need to be applied. Such ambiguity is why the intent behind the
statute is of equal importance as the words. Reasoning by analogy can expand the
legislature’s intent and apply a statute to a specific fact pattern.
120 The House of Representatives approved the American Clean Energy and Security
Act of 2009, which would have established an economy-wide cap-and-trade system, but the
Senate did not. Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2014).
121 Id.
122 Bond, supra note 119, at 28–30 (discussing various shortcomings of the Clean Air
Act as a tool for regulating greenhouse gases).
123 Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule,
75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516 (June 3, 2010).
124 Id.
125 Id. at 31,520.
126 Id. at 31,516.
127 Id.; see also Clean Air Act Permitting for Greenhouse Gases, U.S. ENV’T PROT.
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/nsr/clean-air-act-permitting-greenhouse-gases [https://
perma.cc/9YVT-5HJB].
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Federal agencies have to cope with similar challenges in the face
of congressional inaction when regulating emerging energy markets128
and many non-environmental matters.129 Misfits continue to appear as
Congress is unable to amend obsolete statutes,130 and the need to
respond to new areas that require regulation is satisfied thanks to
transplants, as discussed below.
4. Private Parties’ Transplants
Oil and gas leasing brokered by landmen has a long history in the
United States.131 “Leasing” in this context refers to the practice of
acquiring rights to access the resource (oil and gas) through a particular plot of land and to harvest the resource. As the case study below
on wind shows, when the wind energy industry started to develop,
more recently, it similarly needed to access and exploit resources (in
this case, wind) on private lands. It thus relied on the same familiar
leasing mechanism from oil and gas. Both underground oil and aboveground wind belong by default to the landowner.132 Both resources
need to be pooled, so private parties need to agree to contracts with
developers. Hence, it is natural that oil and gas leases have served as a
model.133 Contracting for land-access and wind rights is largely based
on oil and gas contracting practices. Thus, much like courts and
administrative agencies, private parties also employ internal transplanting techniques in their contractual relationships.134
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128 See Freeman & Spence, supra note 120, at 43 (describing how the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission has regulated emerging energy markets against the backdrop of
the Federal Power Act).
129 See id. at 5–6 (discussing generally how agencies often have to adapt to changing
realities in the face of congressional inaction and older statutes).
130 See id. at 18 (enumerating examples of statutes in need of “makeovers”).
131 Gary Libecap’s work on contracting among landowners toward control of oil and gas
reserves serves as an illustrative example of this strand of literature. GARY D. LIBECAP,
CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 97–98 (1989) (explaining how private agreements
help avoid common pool losses from competitive oil extraction).
132 See Lifshitz, The Geometry of Property, supra note 5, at 502 (stating that
management decisions on wind resources are made according to real-property divisions).
133 See, e.g., David G. Runnels & Bonnie Rubey McMurtry, How Wind, Oil and Gas
Leases Differ, TEX. LAWYER (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.kslaw.com/attachments/000/004/
750/original/3-18-13_Runnels.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UHD-BLV4] (finding that many
landowners today seek to sever their wind rights from their surface rights and thereby sell
them off, similar to how they might sever and sell their rights to underground resources
like minerals).
134 For a similar argument discussing the shifting of doctrines from one area of contract
to another and the process by which such shifting occurs, see Tal Kastner & Ethan J. Leib,
Contract Creep, 107 GEO. L.J. 1277, 1279 (2019) (arguing that although contract law
doctrines often develop to deal with certain types of transactions, legal ideas from one
transactional context often bleed into others). Under the framework offered here, this kind
of doctrinal creep could be conceptualized as an internal-type transplant.

44277-nyu_97-3 Sheet No. 48 Side A

06/13/2022 09:04:56

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\97-3\NYU303.txt

June 2022]

unknown

Seq: 31

NATURAL TRANSPLANTS

8-JUN-22

14:51

963

As mentioned above, lawyers often work in a portfolio of somewhat adjacent areas. For example, a lawyer may cover several natural
resources in his practice. Borrowing from one of them to deal with a
new issue in a different case or client is natural, as we have explained
under the heuristic of availability. Private attorneys may bring analogies before courts, but this Section refers to transplants in the private
sphere, specifically, transplants in contracts.135 Referring to a wellknown contract form or clause may offer a focal point and may
shorten negotiation time. Moreover, in a contract, both parties must
agree to the borrowing of a clause. As such, one may expect such borrowing to be socially beneficial and enhance the positions of both parties. However, there are situations where parties may not be on equal
footing, and, as such, the legal transplant may be beneficial only to
one party.136
D. The Risks of Natural Transplants

06/13/2022 09:04:56

135 Id. (explaining that contract regimes developed to deal with certain types of
transactions might have broad applicability to other types of contractual relationships).
136 For such an example in the natural resource context, see Brian Steinocher, Regulate
or Be Regulated: Why Professional Landmen Should Be Proactive in Protecting the
Integrity of Their Occupations, 4 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. 383, 388–92 (2018) (underscoring
how landowners who negotiate leases with energy companies are often at an informational
disadvantage or inferior bargaining position).
137 As an example, Spain adopted Germany’s feed-in tariff policy to promote solar
power. However, the rates required to promote solar in rainy Germany turned out to be
far too high for sunny Spain. The result was gross overspending by the government, which,
in turn, eroded public support for the policy. Felix Mormann, Enhancing the Investor
Appeal of Renewable Energy, 42 ENV’T L. 681, 729 (2012).
138 See Transplant Rejection, M EDLINE P LUS , https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/
000815.htm [https://perma.cc/4PDY-LPQN] (stating that organ transplant rejections can
occur over a period of weeks, months, or even years).
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Legal transplants are not always successful. Two jurisdictions are
never identical. The economic, political, and social characteristics of a
jurisdiction can influence the operation of the regulation. Accordingly, a successful law in country A may fail in country B.137 As noted
above, legal transplants are not so different from organ transplants,
where the organ can be rejected in the short or in the long term.138
Many critiques of legal transplants are rooted in the transplanting of
legal institutions from developed to underdeveloped countries,
imposed or not, because the receiving country does not have the same
characteristics as the country where the legal institution originated,
and the effects may be detrimental for the importer. Natural transplants do not face the same challenges because they are internal to a
jurisdiction, so the socioeconomic and political context is constant; at
most, there may be differences in the industry players and stake-
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holders. We can imagine one resource being controlled by a few big
international firms, while another is allocated to small businesses in a
state.
The material differences in the context of natural transplants that
may affect the transplant’s success are the natural characteristics of
the resource. There are differences between oil, water, and wind, and
yet courts and regulators, at least in some cases, treat them the
same.139 If our transplant decisions ignore the scientific differences
between resources, the consequences of importing a legal doctrine or
practice can be negative.
As stated in the previous Section, the exploitation of wind rights
followed the oil and gas model on private lands. Wind leases were
modeled after oil and gas leases. This transplant may have impaired
the development of wind rights. As will be explained below, extracting
energy from the wind (for the purpose of producing electricity) has
significant impacts on neighboring users. A neighbor located downwind of a turbine will receive a depleted wind-stream. This could
cause conflicts among neighbors over the use of the airstream, and
such conflicts have indeed arisen in a few instances.140 The effects of
wind energy extraction, however, are not limited to neighborly conflicts, but rather extend to the broader environment. The introduction
of wind energy to an area has been shown to cause changes in temperatures141 as well as levels of precipitation142 and even changes in climate.143 Altering the wind can also affect local ambient pollution
139

See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B for a full discussion of the instances in which conflicts over
the use of wind resources arose, and other practices that signal concern over the potential
conflicts that can result from the wind wakes.
141 See Liming Zhou, Yuhong Tian, Somnath Baidya Roy, Chris Thorncroft, Lance F.
Bosart & Yuanlong Hu, Impacts of Wind Farms on Land Surface Temperature, 2 NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE 539, 539 (2012) (finding a warming trend near wind farms); Somnath
Baidya Roy & Justin J. Traiteur, Impacts of Wind Farms on Surface Air Temperatures, 107
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 17899, 17899 (2010) (showing a warming effect at night and a
cooling effect during the day near wind farms); David Biello, How Wind Turbines Affect
Your (Very) Local Weather, SCI. AM. (Oct. 4, 2010), https://www.scientificamerican.com/
article.cfm?id=how-wind-turbines-affect-temperature [https://perma.cc/DG9Z-BS5Y]
(describing the impact that wind farms can have on regional or local temperatures).
142 See B.H. Fiedler & M.S. Bukovsky, The Effect of a Giant Wind Farm on Precipitation
in a Regional Climate Model, 6 ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS 1, 3 (2011) (finding a “statistically
significant 1.0% enhancement of precipitation in a multi-state area surrounding . . . the
wind farm”).
143 See Daniel B. Kirk-Davidoff & David W. Keith, On the Climate Impact of Surface
Roughness Anomalies, 65 J. ATMOSPHERIC SCIS. 2215 (2008) (describing the various ways
that modifications to the earth’s surface features can effect wind currents and, in turn,
impact the climate); D.B. Barrie & D.B. Kirk-Davidoff, Weather Response to a Large Wind
Turbine Array, 10 ATMOSPHERIC CHEM. PHYSICS 769 (2010) (discussing the effects of wind
farms on climate); L.M. Miller, F. Gans & A. Kleidon, Estimating Maximum Global Land
140
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levels144 and seed pollination145 and has been suggested to influence
radar systems.146 Importantly for our purposes, applying oil and gas
leasing practices in the emerging wind context has only exacerbated
the problem, as the leases do not tend to account for these area-wide
impacts.147 In addition, the severance practices148 which are typical of
oil and gas proved to be unsuccessful in the context of wind.149 This
phenomenon is not exclusive to private parties. It can occur whenever
a court, a legislature, or an agency imports a regulation from a different resource if those institutions ignore the differences between
resources.
But there is also cause for optimism. Sometimes regulators are
able to incorporate a regulatory framework from another resource but
infuse it with the particularities of the resource it is being applied to.
This is what happened in Pennsylvania when municipal waste regulations imported the framework from surface mining but adapted it.150
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Surface Wind Power Extractability and Associated Climatic Consequences, EARTH SYS.
DYNAMICS, Feb.–June 2011, at 1 (“Inevitably, this [huge scale] removal of wind power
from the Earth system must result in climatic impacts.”); Mark Z. Jacobson, Cristina L.
Archer & Willett Kempton, Taming Hurricanes with Arrays of Offshore Wind Turbines, 4
NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 195 (2014) (finding that offshore wind turbines can mitigate
hurricane damage to coastal cities and states).
144 See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography:
Designing Marketable Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28
ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, 601 (2001) [hereinafter Nash & Revesz, Markets and Geography]
(“Winds that carry chemicals great distances and mix atmospheric components can
significantly augment the rate of ozone production.”).
145 See JAMES D. MAUSETH, BOTANY: AN INTRODUCTION TO PLANT BIOLOGY 208–11
(2008) (noting that wind aids plants in dispersal and reproduction).
146 See Felix A. Losco & Thomas F. Collick, When Wind, Wind Turbines, and Radar
Mix—A Case Study, 68 A.F. L. REV. 235 (2012) (evaluating how wind turbines can
interfere with the functioning of air radar systems).
147 See Yael R. Lifshitz, Rethinking Original Ownership, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 513,
545–47 (2016) [hereinafter Lifshitz, Rethinking Original Ownership] (finding that
landowners assert an exclusive position over the wind when it blows over their land, decide
themselves if and how wind gets harvested, and do not necessarily account for the other
widespread ramifications that these leases have on others).
148 “Severance” in this context refers to the splitting of the mineral estate from the
surface estate. In most U.S. states oil and gas are severable from the land title, meaning
that the owner of the land does not necessarily own the right to the oil and gas under it. See
JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 224 (2d ed.,
Thomson Reuters 2011).
149 See Runnels & McMurtry, supra note 133 (highlighting that many states have come
to recognize that in the context of wind leases, the surface owner must generally be more
involved with the lessee than they would in the context of, for example, a mineral lease,
since in the wind context it is harder for the lessee to conduct their business entirely
independent from the landowner).
150 Video Conference Interview with John Dernbach, supra note 113.
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In fact, copying is often the source of innovation.151 For instance,
Johannes Gutenberg introduced moveable type printing by building
on traditional presses at the time and woodblock printing.152 Similarly,
adopting regulations from other resources can save upfront costs
while still allowing for adaptation.
III
HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

OF

NATURAL TRANSPLANTS

The application of oil and gas law doctrines to groundwater in
Texas and the regulation of rights in wind energy illustrate the nature
of internal, cross-subject legal transplants, based on saliency and
heuristics of availability.
Cross-subject borrowing can occur between jurisdictions,
although the case studies will focus on intrajurisdictional transplants:
water law borrowing from oil and gas, and water law or mineral law
influencing wind and solar energy regulations. Taken together, these
examples illustrate how a jurisdiction could, in a sense, copy itself.
A. Water and Oil Do Mix in Texas

06/13/2022 09:04:56

151 See JOHNSON, supra note 21 (theorizing that innovation does not necessarily come
from developing new technologies and ideas purely from scratch but from modifying old
ones or incorporating ideas from other domains into new contexts).
152 The Incunable Era: The Gutenberg Press, OR. STATE UNIV. LIBRS.: SPECIAL
COLLECTIONS & ARCHIVES RSCH. CTR., https://scarc.library.oregonstate.edu/omeka/
exhibits/show/mcdonald/incunabula/gutenberg [https://perma.cc/H5JU-5SP4].
153 Westmoreland & Cambria Nat. Gas Co. v. Dewitt, 130 Pa. 235, 249 (1889) (“Water
and oil, and still more strongly gas, may be classed by themselves, if the analogy be not too
fanciful, as minerals ferae naturae. In common with animals, and unlike other minerals,
they have the power and the tendency to escape without the volition of the owner.”).
154 See, e.g., Julian Brookes, Why Water Is the New Oil, ROLLING STONE (July 7, 2011,
11:20 AM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/why-water-is-the-new-oil198747 [https://perma.cc/642G-D9EU] (“As oil was in the 20th century – the key resource,
a focus of tension, even conflict – so water will be of the 21st, as states, countries, and
industries compete over the ever-more-precious resource.”).
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(Ground)water and oil do not mix, except in Texas, where the
doctrines and rules governing one of these resources are often transplanted to govern the other. Water and oil do share a few commonalities. First, water and oil may be found underground. Second, both are
fugitive resources because there is some movement of them underground.153 Third, while for a long time oil was perceived as the most
important resource for economic prosperity, climate change has
changed the outlook. Now, the consensus is to move away from oil. At
the same time, water scarcity is more acute than ever, and water has
become the new oil, attracting governments and deep-pocket companies to compete for access to the resource.154 However, the differences
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are important too, and they suggest that groundwater and oil allocation should perhaps follow different rules. First, oil reservoirs are nonrenewable and groundwater can be renewable. But replenishment of
groundwater can be affected by overpumping. Overdraft occurs when
recharge of groundwater from precipitation is smaller than groundwater withdrawals.155 Overdraft has numerous negative consequences.
It directly causes a depletion of the aquifer, contributing to groundwater contamination and requiring larger groundwater pumping costs
and drilling of new or deeper wells.156 There are also indirect negative
effects of groundwater overexploitation such as land subsidence, infrastructure damage, harm to groundwater-dependent ecosystems, and
the economic losses from a more unreliable water supply.157 Second,
and relatedly, groundwater systems have to be analyzed both dynamically over time (because there are lagged effects) and across a vast
territory since the aquifers are connected to other resources.158
The Texas Supreme Court, starting in Stephens County v. MidKansas Oil & Gas Co., has applied the rule of capture from groundwater to oil, with references to the similarities between groundwater
and oil.159 Also interesting for the purposes of this Article’s analysis
are the relatively recent transfers from oil and gas law to groundwater
law regarding ownership in place of the resource and the accommodation doctrine.
In Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day, the Texas Supreme Court
adopted the rule of ownership-in-place for groundwater, following the
oil and gas model in Texas.160 In the Day case, the court made a com44277-nyu_97-3 Sheet No. 50 Side A
06/13/2022 09:04:56

155 William M. Alley, Thomas E. Reilly & O. Lehn Franke, Sustainability of GroundWater Resources, USGS, https://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/circ1186/html/intro.html [https://
perma.cc/BNX8-JJTA].
156 Tara Moran, Janny Choy & Carolina Sanchez, The Hidden Costs of Groundwater
Overdraft, WATER IN THE W., https://waterinthewest.stanford.edu/groundwater/overdraft/
[https://perma.cc/6KPC-G2U4].
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 254 S.W. 290, 292 (Tex. 1923) (noting how oil and gas located in the ground, like
water, can flow between spaces or crevices, thereby raising questions about whether one
only acquires ownership over the resource once it is extracted and brought to the surface).
The potential for tragedy that the rule of capture brings for the exploitation of natural
resources has been well documented. See Gary D. Libecap & Steven Wiggins, Contractual
Responses to the Common Pool: Prorationing of Crude Oil Production, 74 AM. ECON.
REV. 87, 88–89 (1984) (describing problems associated with the rule of capture, such as
incentivizing over-drilling of oil); Anderson & Hill, supra note 79, at 492 (explaining that
the rule of capture can lead to unequal distribution of resources and rent-collection when
particularly skilled entrepreneurs race to obtain the resource, thereby boxing-out others).
160 369 S.W.3d 814, 831–32 (Tex. 2012). Texas, New Mexico, Colorado, and Kansas apply
this approach closer to the ad coelum principle. JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 33–34 (6th ed. 2014). Other oil producing states, like California, Oklahoma,
Louisiana, and Wyoming follow the non-ownership theory where the owner of the land has
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a “profit a prendre” right (meaning a right go to a piece of land and extract a product or
resource from it) for the oil and gas beneath the surface estate but only acquires full
ownership once they extract it. Id.
161 Day, 369 S.W.3d at 829.
162 Id. at 830.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 831 (holding that despite various differences between groundwater and oil, the
fundamental approach to regulating the two resources is the same).
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 831 (“Drinking water is essential for life, but fuel for heat and power, at least
in this society, is also indispensable.”).
170 Id.
171 Id.
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parison between groundwater and oil because both are fugacious
resources.161 According to the court, the differences between the two
are the product of regulation and even that seemed to be converging.162 While the Edwards Aquifer Authority argued that the lack
of correlative rights in groundwater implied that it could not be subject to ownership in place, the court considered that the authority
granted to the Edwards Aquifer Authority by the legislature precisely
established the equivalent of correlative rights in groundwater
because the agency’s purpose was to ensure that each landowner gets
a fair share of groundwater.163
The Texas Supreme Court recognized the differences between the
two resources and the ultimate goals of their regulation but ultimately
adopted the same rule for both.164 Oil is a nonrenewable commodity
used primarily for energy production.165 In contrast, groundwater is
renewable, and while it may be sold as a commodity, it has multiple
uses from irrigation to recreation.166 Accordingly, “[g]roundwater regulation must take into account not only historical usage but future
needs, including the relative importance of various uses, as well as
concerns unrelated to use, such as environmental impacts and subsidence.”167 However, the differences between water and oil were not
relevant, according to the court. Instead, the court declared that the
two resources “are governed by the same fundamental principle: each
represents a shared resource that must be conserved under the
Constitution.”168
The court went further and declared both groundwater and oil
are essential, albeit for different reasons: water for life and oil for
modern production.169 The court focused on the commodity nature of
both resources170 as well as the high price of oil today and the foreseeable high price of water in the future.171 It went on to conclude that
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groundwater, like oil and gas, is owned by the landowner in place and
subject to the rule of capture, following the oil case Texas Co. v.
Daugherty.172 The basis for this transplant rests on shaky grounds. The
court ignored the role of climate change in its future prices prediction:
While water will be more scarce and thus more valuable, climate
change mitigation may make oil inexpensive by suppressing demand.
Furthermore, the commodification of water is a controversial issue
that some legislatures are trying to avoid.173
Four years later, the Texas Supreme Court continued its comparison between water and oil and gas by extending the accommodation
doctrine from oil and gas to groundwater.174 In Coyote Lake Ranch,
LLC v. City of Lubbock,175 the groundwater state and the surface
state were separated, very much like in groundwater ranching.176 The
city of Lubbock had bought the groundwater rights from the owners
of Coyote Lake Ranch in the midst of a drought in 1953.177 The issue
at stake was the use of the surface area by the city. The deed provided
that the city has “the rights to use all that part of [the Ranch] necessary or incidental to the taking[,] production, treating[,] transmission[,] and delivery of . . . water.”178 But the Texas Supreme Court
considered that the accommodation doctrine should be applied to
groundwater. The accommodation doctrine was established for oil and
gas in 1971 to regulate the conflicts between the surface estate and the
severed oil estate. The Texas Supreme Court cited oil and gas decisions to state the tenets of the accommodation doctrine:
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172 Id. at 831–32 (quoting Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 580 (1948)); see also
id. at 828 (noting that Stephens County established that ownership in place of oil and gas
was not incompatible with the rule of capture).
173 See generally S.B. B, 73d Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2022), https://
leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/images/committees/2017/22-0179_bill_b.pdf [https://
perma.cc/AW5Q-PABC].
174 The accommodation doctrine for oil and gas was first established in Getty Oil Co. v.
Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 623 (Tex. 1971).
175 498 S.W.3d 53 (Tex. 2016).
176 See Vanessa Casado Pérez, Liquid Business, 47 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 201, 226 (2020)
(describing groundwater ranching).
177 Coyote Lake Ranch, 498 S.W.3d at 55–56.
178 Id. at 56.
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[T]he surface owner must prove that (1) the groundwater owner’s
use of the surface completely precludes or substantially impairs the
existing use, (2) the surface owner has no available, reasonable
alternative to continue the existing use, and (3) given the particular
circumstances, the groundwater owner has available reasonable,
customary, and industry-accepted methods to access and produce
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the water and allow continuation of the surface owner’s existing
use.179

The court analyzed the similarities and differences between
groundwater and oil and gas. Both “exist in subterranean reservoirs in
which they are fugacious” and are subject to the rule of capture.180
Both severed estates, groundwater and mineral, have the right to use
the surface.181 These similarities prompted the Texas Supreme Court
to transfer the oil and gas doctrine of ownership in place to water.182
The court considered that there was no reason not to do the same
here, suggesting a certain path dependency.183 The court also stated
that “[c]ommon law rules governing mineral and groundwater estates
are not merely similar; they are drawn from each other or from the
same source.”184 Even though the court recognized some differences
between the resources, mainly that water is a renewable and lifesustaining resource and oil is nonrenewable and used for energy and
manufacturing, it was “reluctant to search for a new approach to
resolving disputes over a severed estate’s implied right to reasonable
use of the surface when a proven rule [wa]s at hand.”185 Commentators disagree with the court’s view and consider the natural and legal
differences between groundwater and oil to be dispositive,186 suggesting that common law should give way to newer groundwater management rules today given the better scientific understanding of
groundwater.187
The city wanted the court to apply a reasonable standard but,
according to the court, the municipality did not explain how such a
standard would differ from the accommodation doctrine.188 The city
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Id. at 64–65 (citing Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Tex. 2013)).
Id. at 63.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 The city of Lubbock considered the application of the accommodation doctrine
“momentous.” Id. at 64.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Reichenberger, Another Attempt to Mix Oil, Gas, and Water:
An Analysis of the Texas Supreme Court’s Decision to Apply the Accommodation Doctrine
to Groundwater [Coyote Lake Ranch, LLC v. City of Lubbock, 498 S.W.3d 53 (Tex.
2016)], 57 WASHBURN L.J. 367, 387–88 (2018) (commenting on the fact that property rules
for oil and water are different because oil is subject to a single regime during its cycle while
water has separate regimes for surface and groundwater, even though these two are
connected).
187 See id. at 387 (discussing potential new rules). For a discussion of groundwater
exceptionalism and the disconnect between science and law, see generally Christine A.
Klein, Groundwater Exceptionalism: The Disconnect Between Law and Science, 71 EMORY
L.J. 487 (2022).
188 Coyote Lake Ranch, 498 S.W.3d at 64.
180
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in this case centered its arguments on the interpretation of the deed.
However, given that the court believed the deed did not cover the
conflict between surface and groundwater estate uses, competing ways
to resolve the dispute could have been put forward. In particular, the
city could have argued that while the mineral estate and the surface
estate are dominant and subservient respectively, the groundwater
and surface estate are equal, as is the case in federal lands, where
unnecessary and undue degradation of the surface is not allowed.189
While other states may not have specifically addressed the conflict
between a surface owner and a groundwater owner, they do have a
different approach to deal with the relationship between the surface
and the mineral estates. In contrast to Texas’s accommodation doctrine, these states follow a multidimensional approach or a correlative
approach, which, instead of focusing on the rights of the mineral
estate, focuses on the balance between the uses of the surface and the
development of the mineral estate.190 Day and Coyote Lake Ranch
ensure that, in Texas, the development of groundwater law will piggyback off well-developed oil and gas law in the state with the largest oil
and gas production.191
B. Constructing Wind Law
Wind has been harnessed for centuries by seafaring sailors and
mill-grinding farmers.192 But it is only more recently, in the past three
decades or so, that wind has been used more readily in the production
of electricity.193 Wind energy is now the largest form of renewable
energy in the United States, producing 100 gigawatts of electricity,
44277-nyu_97-3 Sheet No. 52 Side A
06/13/2022 09:04:56

189 43 C.F.R. § 1732(b) (2020). Marla Mansfield defines unnecessary or undue
degradation as “surface disturbance greater than what would normally result when an
activity is being accomplished by a prudent operator in usual, customary, and proficient
operations of similar character.” Marla E. Mansfield, On the Cusp of Property Rights:
Lessons from Public Land Law, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 43, 61 (1991). Currently, the Bureau of
Land Management interprets unnecessary and undue degradation in a manner similar to
the accommodation doctrine as it imposes conditions on the mineral development insofar
it does not make the development impractical. Id. at 79–80.
190 See G. Alan Perkins, Rights and Conflicts Among Surface Owners, Mineral Owners,
and Lessees in Arkansas: Comparing Sticks in the Bundle, 68 ARK. L. REV. 381, 390–91
(2015) (describing the Arkansas approach); Bruce M. Kramer, The Legal Framework for
Analyzing Multiple Surface Use Issues, 44 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. J. 273, 273–75
(2007) (describing the “due regard” approach).
191 See Marvin W. Jones & C. Brantley Jones, The Evolving Legacy of EEA v. Day:
Toward an Effective State Water Plan, 68 BAYLOR L. REV. 765, 783 (2016).
192 See generally WIND & WATER IN THE MIDDLE AGES: FLUID TECHNOLOGIES FROM
ANTIQUITY TO THE RENAISSANCE (Steven A. Walton ed., 2006).
193 See History of Wind Power, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/
energyexplained/wind/history-of-wind-power.php [https://perma.cc/VBA4-LK6Y]
(detailing how wind energy use expanded in the wake of the oil shortages in the 1970s).
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enough to supply about 32 million homes.194 Globally, according to
the International Renewable Energy Agency, “[p]roduction of wind
electricity doubled between 2009 and 2013, and in 2016 wind energy
accounted for 16% of the electricity generated by renewables.”195
Given the favorable economics of wind energy196 and the potential for
wind energy both offshore and onshore,197 further growth can likely
be expected.
Why does it matter how we govern the wind? After all, the argument goes, it is a renewable resource. But in fact, the use of wind by
some does diminish or change the uses available to others. Wind is the
movement of air upon the surface of the earth. Wind turbines produce
electricity by converting that movement—known as kinetic energy—
to electric energy. When kinetic energy is pulled out of the airstream
(after it hits a turbine), there is less kinetic energy left for others
downstream.198 These wind wakes can last fifty kilometers downwind,
potentially resulting in losses of millions of dollars.199 More broadly,
harvesting the wind creates externalities in the broader area, such as
changing temperatures, precipitation, pollution levels, climate, seed
pollination, and radar operation.200 Given all these impacts, extracting
wind requires our attention in determining who can use it and to what
extent.
What legal rule governs the use of wind? This question remained
largely unaddressed until about two decades ago. The first modern
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194 AWEA: Wind Energy Now Top Source of Renewable Electricity, AM. CLEAN POWER
(Feb. 27, 2020), https://cleanpower.org/news/awea-wind-energy-now-top-source-ofrenewable-electricity [https://perma.cc/2EU2-JXG2].
195 Wind Energy, INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, https://www.irena.org/wind
[https://perma.cc/T3PF-9SRC].
196 See generally POUL-ERIK MORTHORST & SHIMON AWERBUCH, THE ECONOMICS OF
WIND ENERGY: A REPORT BY THE EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION (Soren Krohn
ed., 2009), https://www.ewea.org/fileadmin/files/library/publications/reports/
Economics_of_Wind_Energy.pdf [https://perma.cc/HTQ5-BUTV]; Analysis: Record-Low
Price for UK Offshore Wind Cheaper than Existing Gas Plants by 2023, CARBON BRIEF
(Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-record-low-uk-offshore-windcheaper-than-existing-gas-plants-by-2023 [https://perma.cc/LDQ7-LDK5].
197 See DOE, WIND VISION, supra note 9, at 21 (discussing the wind energy potential in
the United States and noting that there are over “15,000 GW of technical wind resource
potential, both land-based and offshore, that can be harnessed and delivered reliably”).
198 For but a few examples of studies analyzing wakes, see, for example, R.J. Barthelmie
& L.E. Jensen, Evaluation of Wind Farm Efficiency and Wind Turbine Wakes at the Nysted
Offshore Wind Farm, 13 WIND ENERGY 573, 573 (2010); R.J. Barthelmie et al., Modelling
and Measuring Flow and Wind Turbine Wakes in Large Wind Farms Offshore, 12 WIND
ENERGY 431, 431 (2009).
199 J.K. Lundquist, K.K. DuVivier, D. Kaffine & J.M. Tomaszewski, Costs and
Consequences of Wind Turbine Wake Effects Arising from Uncoordinated Wind Energy
Development, 4 NATURE ENERGY 26, 26 (2019).
200 See infra notes 209–14 and accompanying text.
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68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272 (1997).
See id. at 273.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 276.
206 Id. at 277.
207 Id. at 278.
208 Id.
209 In this case, the result of recognizing wind rights (and their existence separately from
the land) was that the landowner was not awarded additional compensation beyond that
which was received for the value of the land itself. Id. at 273. More broadly, splitting the
control over wind based on parcel ownership (which was itself based on mineral rights
rules) is problematic given the wind wakes and the area-wide impacts of wind extraction.
See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
202
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case to confront the issue was Contra Costa Water District v. Vaquero
Farms, Inc.,201 in California. The case involved a taking of land on
which wind power facilities were installed.202 The water district, the
condemning authority in this case, severed the wind rights from the
land and awarded compensation only for the land itself (excluding the
value of the wind).203 The landowner argued against the severance,
claiming that the water district needed to pay compensation for the
entire value of the property including the wind rights.204 The court
was thus called upon to consider “[w]hen a public entity acquires
property through eminent domain, are the windpower rights capable
of segregation or are they so affixed to the underlying land that they
must be acquired by the condemning authority?”205 The court found
that “windpower rights are ‘substantial rights’ capable of being bought
and sold in the marketplace,”206 and therefore could be severed from
the land.
In doing so, the court held that wind rights were much like rights
in other energy-producing minerals, such as oil and gas.207 Agreeing
with the Water District, the court specifically noted that the “right to
generate electricity from windmills . . . and the right to sell the power
so generated, is no different, either in law or common sense, from the
right to pump and sell subsurface oil, or subsurface natural gas by
means of wells and pumps.”208 Thus, the court recognized a right to
the flow of wind separate from the right to the land itself based on
wind’s similarity to oil and gas.209
Borrowing from oil and gas law to the context of wind proved to
be a quick (and in that sense useful) shortcut. But it also comes at a
cost: In oil and gas, it turned out that splitting control over a broad
(horizontal) resource, based on parcel ownership, led to problems of
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See Lifshitz, The Geometry of Property, supra note 5, at 19 & nn.45–46.
See id. at 31 & nn.87–94.
212 603 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1334–36 (D.N.M. 2009).
213 Id. at 1334.
214 See id. (dismissing the respondent’s argument).
215 Id. at 1335.
216 Id. (“The right to ‘harvest’ wind energy is . . . an inchoate interest in the land which
does not become ‘vested’ until reduced to ‘possession’ by employing it for a useful
purpose.” (quoting Contra Costa Water Dist. v. Vaquero Farms, Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272
(1997))).
217 Id. at 1335–36.
218 Id. at 1335 (“This analysis is consistent not only with logic but with New Mexico’s
legal treatment of the most analogous natural resource, water.”).
219 Id.
220 For a discussion of the potential application of prior appropriation to wind, and its
potential pitfalls, see Yael R. Lifshitz, Winds of Change: Drawing on Water Law Doctrines
to Establish Wind Law, 23 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 434, 474–78 (2015).
211
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premature extraction and overexploitation.210 Having borrowed from
oil and gas, wind is now subject to the same potential problems.211
The question of wind rights, and specifically when and how they
materialize, was also addressed by the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Mexico in Romero v. Bernell.212 The respondent,
opposing the partitioning of a parcel of land owned by tenants in
common, argued that “the property cannot equitably be partitioned
because the principal value of the property appears to be for a wind
farm development.”213 Partitioning the land, the respondent argued,
would diminish the land’s main value.214 Instead of drawing on minerals law as the Contra Costa court did, the Romero court compared
wind to wildlife and water as severable property interests.215
The Romero court thus recognized property in wind, although it
held that such rights only materialize when the resource is captured.216
In this case, since at the time there were no wind turbines on the land,
the court found that the wind interest had not yet materialized and
thus ordered the division of the property.217
Importantly, the court drew explicitly on New Mexico’s prior
appropriation water law mechanisms,218 finding “[i]t is long established in New Mexico that individual rights to water can be acquired
only by appropriation and application of the water to beneficial
use.”219 Here again, borrowing from prior appropriation, especially in
a state like New Mexico where the legal community is familiar with
the prior appropriation regime, could be a useful shortcut for governing a new resource. The risk, however, is that applying a prior
appropriation-like rule, which is based on the rule of capture, to the
context of wind could lead to problems of premature exploitation.220
Aside from these two leading cases, there is otherwise very little
jurisprudence on wind governance. The few adjudicated cases that
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pertain to wind energy installations are typically concerned with the
noise or aesthetics of the turbines, or the wellbeing of the wildlife in
the region, but not wind extraction as such.221
The practice of transplanting regimes from one resource to
another is not reserved for the courts. On federal lands, the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM), which is the largest manager of federal
lands,222 has implemented a process to award lease grants for wind
energy production.223 Through this process, the BLM administers
“rights-of-way” for wind energy production under the authority given
to it by Title V of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA).224 These rights-of-way allow developers to produce energy
from the wind blowing over a specific piece of public land and to
access the underlying land necessary for mounting turbines, transmis-
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221 The question of compensability of wind rights in takings was also addressed by the
Kansas Supreme Court in Zimmerman v. Hudson, 264 P.3d 989 (Kan. 2011). The court
rejected the claims on zoning-related grounds, finding there was “no property for the
purpose of a takings claim.” Id. at 1005. But residents of areas in proximity to turbine
installations have voiced opposition to the projects focusing mainly on the noise, flickers,
and aesthetic impacts of turbines. These are NIMBY-like claims in nature and have mostly
been brought under the nuisance doctrine claiming that the presence of the turbines
interferes with the enjoyment of the land. See, e.g., Rose v. Chaikin, 453 A.2d 1378 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982); Rassier v. Houim, 488 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1992); Burch v.
NedPower Mount Storm, LLC, 647 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 2007); Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC,
266 S.W.3d 506 (Tex. App. 2008). Some courts have found that turbine operations indeed
constitute an enjoinable nuisance. See, e.g., Rose, 453 A.2d 1378; Burch, 647 S.E.2d 879.
Other courts have found in favor of the turbine facilities. See, e.g., Rassier, 488 N.W.2d 635;
Rankin, 266 S.W.3d 506. Suits have also been filed raising concerns over the potential
environmental impacts of turbines, focusing mainly on the wellbeing of birds in the region.
See, e.g., Flint Hills Tallgrass Prairie Heritage Found. v. Scottish Power, PLC, No. 05-1025,
2005 WL 427503, at *4 (D. Kan. Feb. 22, 2005) (holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a
cause of action under federal law because they could not establish that the Migratory Birds
Treaty Act established a private right of action), aff’d 147 Fed. App’x 785 (10th Cir. 2005);
Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)
(rejecting an environmental group’s complaints regarding impacts on birds).
222 Bureau of Land Mgmt., Bureau Highlights, in U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, THE
INTERIOR BUDGET IN BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2021, at BH-7, BH-8 (2020), https://
www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/2021-highlights-book.pdf [https://perma.cc/LW7U5Q7G].
223 The Energy Policy Act (EPAct), passed in 2005, encouraged the Secretary of the
Interior, who oversees both the BLM and BOEM, to approve a minimum of 10,000 MW of
renewable (but non-hydro) energy projects by 2015. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-58, § 211, 119 Stat. 594, 660.
224 43 U.S.C. §§ 1761–1771; see also Competitive Processes, Terms, and Conditions for
Leasing Public Lands for Solar and Wind Energy Development and Technical Changes and
Corrections, 81 Fed. Reg. 92,122, 92,124 (Dec. 19, 2016) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts.
2800, 2880) [hereinafter BLM, Final Wind Rule] (discussing the BLM’s authority to
regulate; explaining that “Title V of FLPMA . . . authorizes the BLM to issue rights-of-way
on the public lands for electric generation systems, including solar and wind energy
generation systems”).
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BLM, Final Wind Rule, supra note 224, at 92,122.
BLM Fact Sheet: Renewable Energy: Wind, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., https://
www.blm.gov/sites/blm.gov/files/Wind%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/QC3YBXQ5]. The approved BLM projects are in Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon,
Utah, and Wyoming. Id. There are also twenty-three pending applications. BLM Fact
Sheet: Renewable Energy: Wind, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., https://www.blm.gov/sites/
blm.gov/files/documents/files/fact_Wind.pdf [https://perma.cc/VBN2-N35X].
227 See BLM, Final Wind Rule, supra note 224, at 92,123, 92,134 (defining these terms).
228 Id. at 92,134.
229 Id.
230 See Lifshitz, Rethinking Original Ownership, supra note 147, at 543 & n.122; Lifshitz,
The Geometry of Property, supra note 5, at 502.
231 Lifshitz, Rethinking Original Ownership, supra note 147, at 543; Lifshitz, The
Geometry of Property, supra note 5, at 502.
226
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sion lines, and other service areas.225 As of 2018, the BLM has
approved thirty-five wind projects on public lands, with a cumulative
capacity of 3,284 megawatts, enough to power almost two million
American homes.226
For our purposes, it is important to note that several of the key
features of the BLM wind framework echo the frameworks adopted
for leasing oil and gas on public lands. For example, the BLM uses a
“multi-component” fee which is made up of an “acreage rent” (correlating to the land area used by the wind project) and a “MW capacity
fee” (which relates to the amount of electricity generated by the wind
project).227 While the similarity to oil and gas developments are not
cited as the sole reason for adopting the fee structure, the similarity
was specifically mentioned and explained by the BLM when
announcing the rule. The structure of a multi-component fee, notes
the BLM, “mirror[s] the multi-component payments received from
activities like oil and gas development where both rent and royalties
are charged.”228 This mirroring, emphasizes the BLM, “ensur[es] consistency across users.”229
More broadly, beyond the explicit references to borrowing by the
courts and agencies, spontaneous borrowing also occurs in the practices of individual developers and landowners. While the law is silent
on the governance of wind, the underlying assumption on which the
market operates is that wind belongs to the landowners. The majority
of wind energy development in the United States takes place on private lands.230 The practice of wind energy is such that when a developer is looking to set up a wind farm, they need to contract with the
landowners to obtain access to the winds blowing over the lands. The
agreements under which these access permissions occur are known as
“wind leases.”231 These wind leases are basically agreements under
which the landowners agree to lease out “their” winds, much like the
oil and gas leases that facilitate access to oil and gas on their lands. A
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few states explicitly embrace the practice of wind leasing.232 Others,
however, are silent on the matter. Nonetheless, the practice of wind
leasing persists and continues to underly both new and existing wind
energy development.233
The practice of wind leasing is rooted in the preexisting tradition
of oil and gas leasing, where the resource—whether it be below or
above the ground—is initially allocated to the landowner, who can
then agree to lease it out (or refrain from doing so). The reliance on
oil and gas leasing in the context of wind has been mentioned specifically by practitioners in the field.234 The same practice also echoes the
centuries-old, property-based concept of ad coelum, which views all
resources (below and above the land) as attached to it.235 The key
point here is that using the property rules applicable to land as a
fallback, or a blueprint, is a type of transplant in itself.236 It illustrates,
again, how the use of a familiar and salient blueprint is used to govern
a new resource.
IV
BEYOND WATER

AND

WIND

A. Existing Natural Transplants in Other Areas

06/13/2022 09:04:56

232 Lifshitz, Rethinking Original Ownership, supra note 147, at 543–44 (offering
examples).
233 Id.
234 See, e.g., Runnels & McMurtry, supra note 133 (stating that “[d]ue to the welldeveloped state of oil and gas leasing in Texas, landowners and their counsel often look to
familiar oil and gas leasing concepts when negotiating wind leases” and further noting that
“[w]hile mineral and wind leases have some similarities, efforts by landowners and their
counsel to apply mineral-leasing concepts to the wind lease are creating challenges”).
235 Lifshitz, The Geometry of Property, supra note 5, at 502.
236 For a similar argument, see Lifshitz, Property Beyond Land, supra note 29.
237 See Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes
and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 520–21, 540 (1984) (outlining the history and
development of certain U.S. landlord-tenant laws).
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While the examples in this paper focused on natural resources
and transplants across these resources, the same idea of natural transplants applies to many other areas too. The term “natural” in this context refers to the fact that it seems intuitive or instinctual for judges,
regulators, or other legal actors to turn to what is familiar. The
descriptions below of this phenomenon in landlord-tenant, family, and
corporate law illustrate how the framework applies outside the context of natural resources.
In the 1960s and 1970s a revolution in landlord-tenant law
occurred, substantially strengthening the rights of tenants.237 One of
the key factors that contributed to the strengthening of tenants’ rights
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was the rise in tenants’ ability to withhold rent if the landlord failed to
keep the flat in decent condition or fulfill other lease-based obligations. This was done by borrowing a particular principle from contract
law into landlord-tenant law, which was a departure from the status
quo during the revolution.238 Before this time, a tenant’s covenant to
pay rent was independent from any other covenant in the lease. But in
Javins, the D.C. Circuit decided to apply the contract law principle of
dependent covenants in the modern residential lease context.239 As a
result, a breach by the landlord of a statutory or contractual duty constituted grounds for the tenant to stop paying rent.240
Transplanting also comes up in adjudicating the controversial
issue of surrogacy. Courts often consider surrogacy cases without legislative guidance. Faced with the need to decide cases in front of them,
different state courts applied adoption rules to cases of partial or complete surrogacy.241 Even legislators have followed the same path of
naturally transplanting adoption regulation to surrogacy situations.242
Another example comes from the realm of business associations.
States have repurposed concepts from corporate law to other types of
business entities. The most prominent example in recent years has
been the adoption of LLC statutes.243 These statutes often include
ideas of fiduciary duties, management rules, and veil piercing244 that
were originally developed in corporate law. In some cases, they make
238

See Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074–80 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
See id. at 1082–83.
240 See Rabin, supra note 237, at 522–23.
241 See, e.g., R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796 (Mass. 1998) (noting that the “normal
expectation in the case of a surrogacy agreement seems to be that the father’s wife will
adopt the child with the consent of the mother (and the father)”). For a general report on
surrogacy across the globe and how researchers, legislators, and judges have applied
adoption regulations to the surrogacy phenomenon, see ALEX FINKELSTEIN, SARAH MAC
DOUGALL, ANGELA KINTOMINAS & ANYA OLSEN, COLUMBIA L. SCH. SEXUALITY &
GENDER L. CLINIC, SURROGACY LAW AND POLICY IN THE U.S.: A NATIONAL
CONVERSATION INFORMED BY GLOBAL LAWMAKING (2016), https://web.law.columbia.edu/
sites/default/files/microsites/gender-sexuality/files/columbia_sexuality_and_gender_law_
clinic_-_surrogacy_law_and_policy_report_-_june_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/TNN4FBLP]. For an account of how courts in Tennessee and Oregon have used adoption-like
rules to deal with surrogacy cases given the lack of legislation, see id. at 10–12.
242 See, e.g., IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 641-99.15 (2013) (specifying certain situations in
which adoption laws apply when establishing new birth certificates following a birth
involving a surrogate arrangement).
243 See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Preserving LLC Veil Piercing: A Response to
Bainbridge, 31 J. CORP. L. 1063, 1063 (2006) (describing the “emergence” of the LLC as
“[c]orporate law’s most dramatic revolution of the last quarter-century”); Douglas K. Moll,
Minority Oppression & the Limited Liability Company: Learning (or Not) from Close
Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 925–27 (2005) (discussing the
emergence of LLC statutes).
244 See generally J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLICAN, LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES: A STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 5:3 (2021 ed.)
239
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sense; in others, less so. According to some scholars, veil piercing was
arbitrarily applied simply because it was available to judges when
LLC cases arose and not because it was intended to apply to LLCs.245
The factors required for veil piercing include fraud, inadequate capitalization, failure to observe corporate formalities, and operation of
the corporation as an alter ego for the shareholders.246 While these
factors are applicable to corporations, they do not all fit the nature of
LLCs. For example, state legislatures have been explicit in not
wanting to subject LLCs to excessive formalisms, so relying on a lack
of formalities to pierce the veil would go against this intent.247 Indeed,
applying veil piercing to LLCs discourages capital formation in small
businesses.248
Finally, the fugitive disentitlement doctrine emerged in the criminal context with respect to the dismissal of appeals by defendants
who had escaped from physical custody.249 The doctrine has since
been applied to civil asset forfeiture. While the Supreme Court in
Degen v. United States refused to do so, citing the dangers of applying
such a severe sanction in the civil context when courts had other
appropriate docket management mechanisms,250 Congress responded
by passing the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000
(CAFRA).251 CAFRA codified the fugitive disentitlement doctrine in
civil forfeiture actions.252 The fugitive disentitlement doctrine is also
applied in immigration contexts. Tania Valdez has criticized this appli-
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(describing various state laws); Eric Fox, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability Companies,
62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1143, 1169 (1994) (discussing veil piercing in the LLC context).
245 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC Veil Piercing, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 77,
82 (2005) (discussing how “the availability of corporate law doctrines as ready made body
of law close at hand” has led courts to permit veil piercing in the LLC context, with many
courts “simply assum[ing] the corporate law standard applies”).
246 Fox, supra note 244; see also Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986);
Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing, 89 TEX. L. REV. 81, 103–04 (2010).
247 See Bainbridge, supra note 245, at 104–05 (2005) (discussing early adoption of
limited liability as a means to encourage entrepreneurship); cf. Rapp, supra note 243, at
1093 n.178 (noting that some courts overlook the formalities factor in the LLC context).
248 See Bainbridge, supra note 245, at 102 (noting that the veil doctrine “encourage[es]
. . . [small businesses] to spend time and effort on organizational formalities that simply do
not address the real problem of negative externalities”).
249 See Tania N. Valdez, Eliminating the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine in Immigration
Matters, 97 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963 (2022) (discussing the emergence of the doctrine);
U.S. Dep’t of Just., The Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine, IMMIGR. LITIG. BULL., Mar. 2013,
at 1 (“[The fugitive disentitlement doctrine] reflects the inherent authority of the federal
courts of appeals to place conditions on the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction. In one
sense, the doctrine is a tool of case management, justifying the dismissal of certain cases
from a court docket.”).
250 517 U.S. 820, 821, 827–29 (1996).
251 28 U.S.C. § 2466.
252 Id.
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cation because it disregards the differences between criminal and
immigration cases.253
B. Implications for Current Debates: The Next Frontier in Natural
Resources
Armed with a richer understanding of the operation of natural
legal transplants—that is, cross-subject, intrajurisdictional transplants—this Section aims to analyze current developments in the regulation of new resources and their potential evolution to show how
natural transplants may operate in these new regimes.
1. Outer Space Minerals

253
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Valdez, supra note 249.
Ezzy Pearson, Space Mining: The New Goldrush, BBC SCI. FOCUS MAG. (Dec. 11,
2018), https://www.sciencefocus.com/space/space-mining-the-new-goldrush [https://
perma.cc/3AWM-QBPZ].
255 Eva Vermeulen, Property’s Transformative Nature: Space Mining, Airbnb, and
Apartheid, TRANSFORMATIVE PRIV. L. B LOG (Nov. 2, 2020), https://
transformativeprivatelaw.com/transformative-property-law [https://perma.cc/ERB9-66X6].
256 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, 129 Stat.
704 (2015).
257 Id.
258 Rhett B. Larson, Extraterrestrial Water Law 4 (Jan. 25, 2022) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with authors).
259 Id. (citing Mark J. Sundahl & Jeffrey A. Murphy, Set the Controls for the Heart of the
Moon: Is Existing Law Sufficient to Enable Resource Extraction on the Moon?, 48 GA. J.
INT’L & COMPAR. L. 683, 684 (2020)).
254
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“Space mining” is said to be the new Gold Rush.254 The regime
governing the extraction of extraterrestrial resources has, in many
ways, transplanted our familiar property law systems from Earth into
outer space. As one scholar recently noted, “we copy-pasted our property law system.”255
Congress enacted the Spurring Private Aerospace
Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship (SPACE) Act in 2015. The
SPACE Act allows U.S. citizens to engage in the commercial exploration and exploitation of “space resources.”256 The Act expressly lists
water as one of the resources it covers.257 As Rhett Larson has
recently pointed out, the regime governing the extraction and use of
extraterrestrial water under the SPACE Act is akin to prior appropriation, as it adopts a “first-in-time, first-in-right” approach.258 The
United States is not the only country to apply the familiar “first-intime, first-in-right” rule to space exploration. Japan and Luxembourg,
for example, both passed similar legislative provisions.259
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In 2020, President Donald Trump issued an executive order which
eventually led to the creation of the Artemis Accords.260 The accords
were ultimately signed by the United States and seven other countries
(Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the United Arab
Emirates, and the United Kingdom).261 The Artemis Accords took a
similar approach to appropriating resources in space—that is,
adopting a first-in-time kind of rule—and, according to some scholars,
even went further by rejecting the idea of outer space as a “global
commons.”262
Before the current wave of space-related regulation, the Outer
Space Treaty governed space exploration. Rhett Larson argues that
these two regimes—the SPACE Act/Artemis Accords and the Outer
Space Treaty—represent the two main regimes governing the use of
surface-water law in the United States.263 Whereas the SPACE Act
roughly correlates with prior appropriation, the Outer Space Treaty is
more akin to riparianism.264 Future unilateral regulation may reinforce the saliency hypothesis put forward in this piece if countries
follow the regulatory model of their most bountiful resource.
2. Deep Seabed Minerals on the New Frontier
The prospect of deep-sea mining has attracted interest since the
1960s. Deep-sea mining refers to the exploration and development of
polymetallic nodules on the ocean floor and active or extinct hydrothermal vents containing minerals.265 Deep-sea mineral quantities surpass those found on Earth’s surface and are important for renewable
energy technologies needed to fight climate change.266
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260 Larson, supra note 258 (manuscript at 9); see also The Artemis Accords: Principles
for a Safe, Peaceful, and Prosperous Future, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemisaccords/index.html [https://perma.cc/5B7X-UX64] (summarizing the Artemis Accords);
Aaron Boley & Michael Byers, U.S. Policy Puts the Safe Development of Space at Risk, 370
SCI. 174, 174 (2020) (critiquing U.S. policy approaches to space development).
261 See Larson, supra note 258 (manuscript at 10); NASA, International Partners
Advance Cooperation with First Signings of Artemis Accords, NASA (Oct. 13, 2020),
https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-international-partners-advance-cooperation-withfirst-signings-of-artemis-accords [https://perma.cc/Y9YJ-J2S8].
262 Larson, supra note 258 (manuscript at 9); Boley & Byers, supra note 260, at 174.
263 Larson, supra note 258.
264 Id. (manuscript at 11).
265 See Kathryn A. Miller, Kirsten F. Thompson, Paul Johnston & David Santillo, An
Overview of Seabed Mining Including the Current State of Development, Environmental
Impacts, and Knowledge Gaps, FRONTIERS MARINE SCI., Jan. 2018, at 4.
266 Daniel Ackerman, Deep-Sea Mining: How to Balance Need for Metals with
Ecological Impacts, SCI. AM. (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
deep-sea-mining-how-to-balance-need-for-metals-with-ecological-impacts1 [https://
perma.cc/WY24-BD5X].
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These minerals reside in the high seas, beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of states. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) established the International Seabed
Authority, based in Kingston, Jamaica, to manage these resources for
the benefit of mankind.267 The International Seabed Authority was
operative in 1996 after the 1994 Agreement Relating to the
Implementation of Part XI of UNCLOS.268
The regulation of these bountiful resources has always been controversial. There were numerous discussions about the best regime
even before UNCLOS was signed.269 The International Seabed
Authority and the principles regulating the exploration and exploitation of the seabed minerals is one of the reasons why the United
States has not ratified UNCLOS, despite recognizing parts of it as customary international law.270 A new agreement in 1994 did address
some of the United States’s concerns over the Authority and the
wealth redistribution scheme.271 Regardless, the United States
remains an observer country in the International Seabed Authority.272
While the interest in deep-sea minerals has not waned, the technology for its exploration was historically too expensive, and the regulatory environment too uncertain,273 for their exploitation to take off.
Only recently has exploration perked up,274 both because satisfying
renewable energy demand requires copper, nickel, and other seabed
minerals and because the International Seabed Authority finalized the
Mining Code in 2020, alleviating at least some concerns over regulatory uncertainty.275
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267 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397, Arts. 156–57 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994).
268 See About ISA, INT’L SEABED AUTH., https://www.isa.org.jm/index.php/es/node/
19199 [https://perma.cc/J92Y-T6LC] (providing a historical overview of the ISA).
269 See Memorandum from the L. Offs. of Northcutt Ely on Potential Regimes for Deep
Sea Mining 36C-2 (1977) (listing and discussing potential alternative regimes).
270 PHILIP JONES, MAX MCGRATH-HORN, MATT MERIGHI, STEPHEN MURRAY, CULLAN
RILEY, BOGDAN ROTAR, KRITTIKA SINGH, MEAGHAN TOBIN, TIMOTHY URBAN, JACK
WHITACRE & STEVEN YOUNG, LAW OF THE SEA: A POLICY PRIMER 4–10 (John Burgess,
Lucia Foulkes, Philip Jones, Matt Merighi, Stephen Murray & Jack Whitacre eds., 2017)
https://sites.tufts.edu/lawofthesea/chapter-one [https://perma.cc/JN93-YTNQ].
271 See Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Economic Foundations of the Law of the Sea,
104 AM. J. INT’L L. 569, 587 (2010) (discussing how the 1994 agreement weakened agency
power over deep seabed exploration).
272 See Observers, INT’L SEABED AUTH., https://isa.org.jm/index.php/observers [https://
perma.cc/2XDR-9X52] (listing observing countries).
273 See Ackerman, supra note 266 (discussing the “lack of international rules to govern
the nascent [deep-sea mining] industry”).
274 Id.
275 The Mining Code, INT’L SEABED AUTH., https://www.isa.org.jm/mining-code [https://
perma.cc/T74X-J3UK]; see also Ackerman, supra note 266.
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The Mining Code has been in the works for almost a decade.
Stakeholders have had the opportunity to comment on several iterations. Their comments have often referred to other regulatory
regimes.276 For example, regarding the Environmental Management
Plan, the model of the OSPAR Guidelines for Monitoring the
Environmental Impact of Offshore Oil and Gas Activities was put forward.277 For regulating emergencies, the stakeholders suggested
looking at the International Convention on Oil Pollution
Preparedness, Response, and Cooperation as well as the EU Directive
2012/18/EU on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances.278 For risk assessment, the proposed model also
suggests transferring traditional oil and gas frameworks. Stakeholders
and policymakers continue to transfer different aspects of oil and gas
law, albeit sometimes with adaptation.279 The notes from the
Secretariat of the International Seabed Association in February 2020
refer to oil and gas regulations with regards to inspection matters.280
Oil and gas regulations are salient because of their economic relevance and the common development of deep-sea reserves. Land
mining, by contrast, is not acknowledged as a regulatory model. Borrowing from oil and gas in this case thus serves as an illustrative
example of natural transplants in action.
CONCLUSION
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276 See INT’L SEABED AUTH., DEVELOPING A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR DEEP
SEA MINERAL EXPLOITATION IN THE AREA: DRAFT FRAMEWORK, HIGH LEVEL ISSUES
AND
ACTION PLAN (2015), https://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/OffDocs/
Rev_RegFramework_ActionPlan_14072015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2ZY-46RJ] (discussing
stakeholder comments).
277 Id. at 31–32.
278 Id. at 33 n.45.
279 Id. at 31, 45, 47, 49 (discussing how existing oil and gas frameworks should be used as
benchmarks).
280 Note by the Secretariat, Int’l Seabed Auth., Comments on the Draft Regulations on
the Exploitation of Mineral Resources in the Area, at 5 (Dec. 6, 2019), https://
www.isa.org.jm/files/files/documents/advance_isba_26_c_comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KFW8-A3ZW].
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Understanding the mechanisms by which legal regimes develop is
particularly important in our times, with innovative technologies, new
resources, and rising health-related and economic challenges constantly coming to the fore. From drones and novel vaccines to
hydrofracking, aquaculture, and deep-sea mining, the legislative, executive, and judicial branches constantly encounter new issues in need of
regulation.
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This Article has shown that when facing new questions, jurisdictions often copy their own doctrines and regulations from a different
subject matter. To explain this phenomenon, the Article builds on and
expands the literature of legal transplants with two additional dimensions: internal transplants and cross-subject transplants. When these
two dimensions combine, natural legal transplants take place. Jurisdictions copy their own doctrines across subject areas for a myriad of
reasons, chief among them the cost savings arising from the application of a doctrine that the legal community is already familiar with. In
natural resources, the most salient resource in a jurisdiction turns out
to be the source of doctrines for other areas, as illustrated by the case
studies on Texas groundwater and wind regulation. Saliency is often
correlated with the economic relevance of a particular resource. Regulatory innovations following the regulations and doctrines of the
most salient resource show the heuristic of availability at work and
can result in poorly fitting regulations for the new resource in question. As the Texas groundwater case study demonstrates, doctrines
borrowed from different areas of law may not respond to the particularities of the new challenge presented.
While the focus here is on natural resources, natural legal transplants—internal, cross-subject transplants—occur well beyond this
legal area. In fact, “natural” in natural legal transplants refers not to
the area of the law but to the fact that it seems intuitive or instinctual
for judges, regulators, or other legal actors to turn to what is familiar,
using a sort of heuristic of availability or path dependency to respond
to new challenges. Landlord-tenant law, surrogacy regulation, and the
veil piercing doctrine in corporate law illustrate the use of natural
legal transplants in other areas of the law. Examples abound and will
keep appearing, as deep-sea and space minerals show. Indeed, this
Article demonstrates that legal actors will continue to turn to what is
familiar and copy rules and doctrines from other legal areas. In doing
so, these legal actors should account for the differences between areas
and the potential for misfit. Otherwise, natural legal transplants may
not only prove to be a fruitless exercise, but a perilous practice.
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